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Dollars and Death
Eric A. Posner* and Cass R. Sunstein**
Abstract. Administrative regulations and tort law both impose controls on activities that
cause mortality risks, but they do so in puzzlingly different ways. Under a relatively new
and still-controversial procedure, administrative regulations rely on a fixed value of a
statistical life representing the hedonic loss from death. Under much older law, tort law in
most states excludes hedonic loss from the calculation of damages, and instead focuses on
loss of income, which regulatory policy ignores. Regulatory policy also disregards losses to
dependents; tort law usually allows dependents to recover for loss of support. Regulatory
policy generally treats the loss of the life of a child as equivalent to the loss of the life of an
adult; tort law usually treats the loss of the life of a child as less valuable. Regulatory policy
implicitly values foreigners as equal to Americans; tort law does not. We argue that both
areas of law make serious mistakes in valuing life and that each should learn from the
other. Regulatory policy properly focuses on hedonic loss from death, and tort law should
adopt this approach. But regulatory policy should imitate tort law’s individualized approach
to valuing the loss from death, including its inclusion of losses to dependents. If these
changes were made, tort awards would be more uniform and predictable, and regulations
would be less uniform and more stringent. In addition, average tort damages for wrongful
death would be at least twice as high as they are today. With respect to dollar judgments for
mortality risks, a pervasive issue is how to combine accuracy with administrability and
predictability; both bodies of law could do far better on this score.

How should the legal system assign dollar values to human lives? Consider a
highly publicized example.
On September 22, 2001, Congress enacted legislation to compensate the survivors
of the attacks of eleven days earlier.1 Under the final regulations,2 survivors were
permitted to claim amounts for both economic and non-economic losses. The economic
losses were to be measured by calculating each victim’s expected lost wages from
*
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Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, § 405(c)1-2, 49 U.S.C § 40401 (2001).
2
See http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/. For discussion, see Symposium, 53 DePaul L Rev 205
(2003).
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September 11, 2001 through the anticipated date of retirement, subject to several
adjustments, including a reduction by an estimate of household consumption or
expenditure by the victim. Noneconomic losses were set at $250,000 per victim plus
$100,000 per surviving spouse and for each surviving child.3
In all, 2,878 families, about 97 percent of those eligible, received compensation
from the fund, with amounts ranging from a low of $250,000 to a high of $7.1 million;
the average award totaled about $2.1 million per family.4 Hence there was significant
variability among awards. But the variability came amidst a serious effort to produce
presumptive floors and caps, with a “baseline” for single decedents of $300,0005 and a
commitment to allow awards exceeding $3,000,000 only in unusual circumstances. These
awards have been attacked on multiple grounds, including excessive and insufficient
variability.6
The September 11 awards reflect a strong influence from tort law, which they
simultaneously modify. But in American law, tort doctrines provide only one of two sets
of rules for monetizing death. The other comes from administrative regulations, and there
are striking contrasts between the two bodies of law. One of our main goals here is to
bring the two in contact with one another.
Countless regulations now attempt to reduce statistical risks. Cost-benefit analysis
must generally accompany these regulations, at least if their costs are high,7 and to
undertake that analysis, agencies must turn human lives into monetary equivalents.8 For
example, the Environmental Protection Agency values each life at a uniform number,
most recently $6 million.9 Through tort law, courts provide a set of fact-specific awards
3

28 C.F.R. § 104.44 (2004).
See David W. Chen, After Weighing Value of Lives, 9/11 Fund Completes Its Task, The New York
Times, June 16, 2004, at A1.
5
66 Fed Reg 66,274-75.
6
See Alina Tugend, Lives in the Balance, The National Journal Government Executive, September 2003, at
50; David W. Chen, Man Behind Sept. 11 Fund Describes Effort as a Success, With Reservations, The
New York Times, January 1, 2004, at B3.
7
See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 120-35 (5th ed. 2002).
8
A general overview can be found in Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Analysis, Circular A4 (September 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpol.html#rr
9
See 66 Fed. Reg. at 7012. In its July 2003 regulation governing food labeling of trans fatty acids, the Food
and Drug Administration used a VSL of $6.5 million, see 68 Fed. Reg. 41434, 41488 (July 11, 2003); in its
March 13, 2003 proposed rule on dietary ingredients and dietary supplements, the same agency suggested a
VSL of $5 million, see 68 Fed. Reg. 12158, 12229 (using this value to calculate the “value of a statistical
life day”).
4
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that attempt to compensate for and to deter wrongful death. The resulting awards are
highly variable. For example, courts have recently given successful plaintiffs as little as a
few thousand dollars and as much as tens of millions of dollars.10
Notwithstanding their overlapping goals, administrative regulations and tort law
diverge from one another in dramatic and puzzling ways. The most obvious difference is
that tort law generally disregards the welfare loss to the person who has died; regulatory
policy treats that loss as its central and indeed exclusive focus. Consider a few other
differences:
Tort law focuses directly on the loss to dependents;11 regulatory policy pays
no attention to that loss.12
Tort law makes damages a function of lost income; regulatory policy
disregards lost income.

Some individuation has been suggested by the interest in statistical life-years, a measure that
naturally produces a higher degree of particularity. Office of Management & Budget, Circular A-4,
Regulatory Analysis, at 30 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a4.pdf. More specifically, the guidelines say:
Another way that has been used to express reductions in fatality risks is to use the life expectancy
method, the "value of statistical life-years (VSLY) extended." If a regulation protects individuals whose
average remaining life expectancy is 40 years, a risk reduction of one fatality is expressed as "40 life-years
extended." Those who favor this alternative approach emphasize that the value of a statistical life is not a
single number relevant for all situations. In particular, when there are significant differences between the
effect on life expectancy for the population affected by a particular health risk and the populations studied
in the labor market studies, they prefer to adopt a VSLY approach to reflect those differences. You should
consider providing estimates of both VSL and VSLY, while recognizing the developing state of knowledge
in this area.
Longevity may be only one of a number of relevant considerations pertaining to the rule. You
should keep in mind that regulations with greater numbers of life-years extended are not necessarily better
than regulations with fewer numbers of life-years extended. In any event, when you present estimates based
on the VSLY method, you should adopt a larger VSLY estimate for senior citizens because senior citizens
face larger overall health risks from all causes and they may have accumulated savings to spend on their
health and safety.
The valuation of fatality risk reduction is an evolving area in both results and methodology.
Hence, you should utilize valuation methods that you consider appropriate for the regulatory circumstances.
Since the literature-based VSL estimates may not be entirely appropriate for the risk being evaluated (e.g.,
the use of occupational risk premia to value reductions in risks from environmental hazards), you should
explain your selection of estimates and any adjustments of the estimates to reflect the nature of the risk
being evaluated. You should present estimates based on alternative approaches, and if you monetize
mortality risk reduction, you should do so on a consistent basis to the extent feasible. Id.
10
See below.
11
For this and other statements about tort law, see notes below.
12
See, e.g., Regulatory Analysis, supra note, and 66 FR 6976-01 (2001) (arsenic regulation), in support of
all of the statements in this section on regulatory policy.
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Tort law uses a case-specific number to assess damages, making individual
differences crucial; regulatory policy embodies a uniform number per life
saved, one that fails to pay attention to individual differences.
Tort law focuses directly on the suffering and distress felt by the decreased;
regulatory policy does not attend to that issue.
Tort law generally treats children as worth less than adults, because survivors
lose less, in economic terms, when children die; regulatory policy generally
treats children as equivalent to adults.13
Tort law treats foreign victims of torts differently from American victims,
implicitly valuing them less, because of deference to local law, unless they are
killed in the United States, in which case American values are used. Insofar as
regulations affect people outside of the country, regulatory policy generally
ignores foreigners altogether, implicitly treating their lives as valueless.
What accounts for these differences? It is tempting to say that the answer lies in
the conflicting goals of the two sets of controls. While tort law seeks to ensure
compensation, especially for family members, regulatory policy is designed to produce
optimal levels of risk. This point contains some truth. Tort law has long focused on the
compensation of those still living—a focus that naturally leads to disregard of the
deceased, an emphasis on what the plaintiffs have lost, and an interest in a set of highly
individuated awards. By contrast, regulatory policy, which has assigned monetary values
to statistical lives for little more than two decades, is concerned above all with producing
the right deterrent signal, a concern that might seem to explain the use of a single,
uniform number for the valuation of what most matters: the loss of life. But as a full
account of the differences, this explanation is much too simple.14 Tort law does and
should provide deterrence as well as compensation, and if wrongful death actions
produce significant underdeterrence, something is seriously amiss. In any case the
catalogue of differences raises many questions about regulatory policy even if it is
focused on deterrence. If the goal of administrative regulation is optimal risk levels,

13
14

The recent interest in “statistical life-years” would value children more than adults; see below.
We return to this question in Part V.
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should regulators really use a uniform value per life saved? Should they disregard the
suffering felt by dependents—and by those who die?15
For both bodies of law, a pervasive question is how to combine accuracy with
administrability. A simple and uniform number, accompanied by blanket exclusions of
values that are hard to calculate, might well be simplest to administer—and regulatory
policy generally takes this approach.16 In addition, an effort at greater accuracy might
invite interest-group maneuvering; a uniform number provides a degree of insulation
against special pleading. But if full compensation and optimal deterrence are the goals,
then a high degree of individuation should be expected, tailoring dollar amounts to the
precise circumstances of mortality risks. Suppose, for example, that both regulators and
courts possessed “hedometers,”17 costlessly able to calculate the anticipated or actual
loss, to all, from every human death. If hedometers were available, courts could ensure
perfectly accurate compensation, and both courts and regulators would bring about
optimal deterrence, attuned to individual circumstances. If administrative costs were zero,
different agencies should offer a wide range of diverse values for statistical lives, subject
15

It would be possible to argue that both of these are picked up by figures for VSL: we explore that
question below.
16
The most explicit discussions of varying VSL have come from the EPA. In its 2003 discussion of
hazardous air pollutants, see 68 Fed. Reg. 1660, 1693 (Jan. 13, 2003), the EPA noted that there “is general
agreement that the value to an individual of a reduction is mortality risk can vary based on several factors,
including the age of the individual, the type of risk, the level of control the individual has over the risk, the
individual’s attitude toward risk, and the health status of the individual.” Nonetheless, the agency
announced, without offering reasons, that it “prefers not to draw distinctions in the monetary value assigned
to the lives saved even if they differ in age, health status, socioeconomic status, gender or other
characteristic of the adult population.” Id.
An extended discussion of related issues can be found in the EPA’s arsenic proposal, see 65 Fed.
Reg. 38888, 38945 (June 22, 2000). There the EPA noted that the “factors which may influence the
estimate of economic benefits associated with avoided cancer fatalities include (1) a possible ‘cancer
premium’ (i.e., the additional value or sum that people may be willing to pay to avoid the experiences of
dread, pain and suffering, and diminished quality of life associated with cancer-related illness and ultimate
fatality); (2) the willingness of people to pay more over time to avoid mortality risk as their income rises;
(3) a possible premium for accepting involuntary risks as opposed to voluntary [sic] assumed risks; (4) the
greater risk aversion of the general population as opposed to workers in the wage-risk valuation studies;
(5) ‘altruism’ or the willingness of people to pay more to reduce risk in other sectors of the populationl and
(6) a consideration of health status and life years remaining at the time of premature mortality.” The EPA
acknowledged that these factors “may significantly increase the present value estimate,” but said that “there
is currently neither a clear consensus among economists about how to simultaneously analyze each of these
adjustments nor is there adequate empirical data to support quantitative estimates for all potentially
significant adjustment factors.” Id. Hence the EPA solicited comments on these issues and said that it
would ask its Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to conduct a review. Id.
17
For those who are skeptical of utilitarian approaches, substitute the term “eudaimeters,” based on the
Greek notion of eudaimonia, establishing a more complex notion of well-being. See Martha Nussbaum,
The Fragility of Goodness (1986).
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to the limitation that regulatory programs often apply to many people at once; and courts,
focusing on individual cases, would offer an even wider range of dollar awards in the
event of wrongful death.
Because administrative costs are high (and also because of political constraints on
inequality18), more uniformity is inevitable; but how much? One of the most noteworthy
features of the comparative exercise is that agencies opt for uniformity, whereas courts
call for a high degree of individuation. Undoubtedly this difference is partly a function of
the ex post focus of wrongful death actions and the ex ante focus of regulation. But it
would be most surprising if the radical difference, on this count, could be justified by that
difference in perspective.
We believe that both bodies of law can learn a great deal from the other.19 In
particular, we suggest five large-scale reforms. First, agencies should move in the
direction of the more individuated approach of tort law. They should not use a uniform
number per life saved. In addition, they should consider pain and suffering, dread,20 and
loss to dependents. These changes would make a dramatic difference for administrative
practice, replacing the crude current effort to use a single value for statistical lives.
Second, courts should move in the direction of administrative regulation by taking
account of the welfare loss to the decedent. This change would significantly alter
wrongful death cases, by producing far higher recoveries in many cases. Third, agencies
should move in the direction of courts by including the emotional distress and other
welfare losses incurred by dependents; courts should not ignore losses of support for
dependents (as agencies do), but they should offer more accurate and fine-grained
understandings of that figure. These changes would increase the stringency of
administrative regulations and promote less arbitrary figures from courts. Fourth, both
courts and agencies should change their valuation of the deaths of children by taking the
child’s welfare loss seriously while also accounting for the possibility of offsetting
18

See below.
There is a third body of relevant law: criminal prohibitions. These prohibitions overlap, to some extent,
with both tort law and administrative regulation, carving out a subset of conduct for special sanctions. By
attending to enforcement levels and sanctions, it might even be possible to deduce an implicit value of life,
or of statistical risks, from criminal law. Ideally, of course, legislators would ensure that all three bodies of
law worked well together, producing the right deterrent signal. For present purposes, however, we put
criminal law to one side.
20
On some of the complexities here, see Matthew Adler, Fear Assessment (unpublished manuscript 2004)).
19
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behavior by parents. Fifth, agencies and courts should evaluate mortality risks that are
imposed on foreigners—both resident aliens and nonresident aliens whose mortality is
affected by domestic activities—in a manner that is consistent with the diplomatic
objectives of the political branches.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I provides the background from both tort
law and regulatory policy. Part II discusses the theoretical basis for valuing human lives.
Part III investigates a range of methodological difficulties and implications. Part IV
proposes reforms to tort law and regulatory policy. Part V explores the question why tort
law and regulatory policy currently take such different approaches to valuing loss of life.

I. Background
A. How Tort Law Values Loss of Life
At common law, victims (that is, their estates) and dependents could not recover
damages for wrongful death. As a result, courts did not face the problem of calculating
damages for loss of life. In the nineteenth century, however, many states enacted statutes
that provided for recoveries. Wrongful death statutes provided that dependents, including
spouses and children, may recover damages for lost support. Survival statutes provided
that the victim’s estate may recover damages for certain losses that the victim incurred as
a result of the tort, such as medical expenses and earnings lost between injury and
death.21 Today, most states have one or both types of statutes, or statutes that combine
elements of each type. In addition, there has been much judge-created common law that
can be traced to these statutes. As a general proposition, one can say that courts now
award damages on account of death caused by a tort, but the rules vary widely by
jurisdiction. 22
Despite the variations, there are common themes. Most courts award “noneconomic” damages, that is, damages for pain and suffering incurred by the victim as a
result of the tort prior to death, and also for the distress and loss of companionship

21
22

2 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 423 (2d ed. 1993).
Id., at 421-445.
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suffered by dependents or heirs.23 All states award “economic” damages. In states that
use the “loss to dependents” measure, these damages are supposed to make dependents
whole; roughly, they provide the support that dependents would have received if the
victim had lived. This may be measured as lost contributions from victims to dependents
(housing, food, and so forth), or, more crudely, future income minus victim’s expenses.
In states that use the “loss to estate” measure, damages are supposed to approximate the
victim’s estate if she had lived a natural life—total future income minus expenses.24
Notice that the non-economic and economic measures do not provide an award
for the loss of life per se—that is, the victim’s “loss of life’s pleasure,” also known as
hedonic damages. Plaintiffs suing on behalf of a victim who has no future income, no
dependents, and no spouse, and who dies without feeling pain, should ordinarily receive
zero damages or damages sufficient only to cover funeral expenses.25 This large category
of people includes elderly people who are living off savings and unemployed or homeless
people. It also includes homemakers, unless an implicit value is assigned to household
services. And it includes children—at least in “loss to dependent” states, because children
do not have dependents who lose support as a result of their death.26
Of course, this is a matter of formal law; in practice, damages are often awarded
on account of the deaths of people who have no income, and often damages are in excess
of lost income. This is partly because non-economic damages will be available in most
cases, partly because juries are given a great deal of discretion to award damages in
wrongful death cases and are provided little guidance by courts, and partly because courts
use fictions in order to ensure a “reasonable” recovery.27 But if all this is true, then

23

Id. There is every reason to believe that the resulting awards have a high degree of arbitrariness. See
David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior To Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
256 (1989).
24
Id., at 430-38.
25
E.g., McGowan v. Wright, 524 So.2d 308 (Miss. 1988).
26
In “loss to estate” states, the child’s future income will be calculated, and awarded to parents or heirs.
See Dobbs, supra, at 436.
27
For example, the household services of the child – which in most households, and certainly modern
middle class households, are trivial – may be given a high value. See Dobbs, supra, at 440.
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damages for wrongful death are highly arbitrary,28 and indeed this is the conventional
wisdom,29 supported by our own evidence as discussed below.30
Only five states permit damages for hedonic loss: Arkansas,31 Connecticut,32
Hawaii,33 New Hampshire,34 and New Mexico.35 As a matter of theory, plaintiffs in these
states can recover damages on account of the wrongful death of people who have no
income and otherwise would not be entitled to non-economic damages. However, the
statutes and judicial opinions in these states do not explain the methodology, and judges
usually leave the calculation to the jury, with lax oversight.36 In some cases, courts
appear to misunderstand the nature of hedonic loss—for example, confusing it with lost
income.37
The upshot is that it is exceptionally hard to predict, as a matter of formal law,
what damages for wrongful death will be in any particular case. However, verdict and
settlement data can be used to paint a rough picture. We examined data from two data
sets: (1) an unscientific Jury Verdict and Settlement data set that provides a wealth of
information about the characteristics of the cases (“JVS”)38; and (2) a more scientific

28

Even aside from the legal confusion, jurors do not do a good job of monetizing losses when provided
with no clear guidance to discipline their judgments. David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The
Severity Shift, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1139 (2000).
29
See, e.g., David Baldus, John C. MacQueen, and George Woodworth, Improving Judicial Oversight of
Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for
Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 1109 (1995).
30
See TAN infra.
31
See Durham v. Marberry, 2004 Ark. LEXIS 179 (interpreting ambiguous 2001 amendment to Arkansas
survival statute (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-101(b)) as permitting recovery for hedonic loss).
32
See Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172 (Conn.1976); Chase v. Fitzgerald, 45 A.2d 789 (Conn.1946).
33
See Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 364 (Haw. 1994).
34
See Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead School District, 733 A.2d 394 (N.H. 1999).
35
See New Mexico St. §41-2-1 (discussed in Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1245 (N.M.
2000)). Mississippi briefly allowed damages for hedonic losses in wrongful death cases, but the case that
approved such damages – Choctaw Maid Farms v. Hailey, 822 So.2d 911 (2002) – was overturned by
statute. See Brendan I. Koerner, What’s Your Happiness Worth?, Legal Affairs, January/February 2004.
Hedonic losses may also be permitted in federal civil rights cases involving wrongful death. See Sherrod v.
Berry, 629 F. Supp. 195, 205 (N.D.Ill.1985), rev’d on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988); Frye v.
Town of Akron, 759 F. Supp. 1320, 1325-26 (N.D. Ind. 1991). However, it is not yet clear whether other
circuits will follow Sherrod. See Wescott v. Crinklaw, 133 F.3d 658, 660-61 (8th Cir. 1998).
36
See Dobbs, supra, at 445.
37
Cohen suggests that they have not, citing Lengel v. New Haven Gas Co., 111 A.2d 547 (1955), where the
court reversed an award of $60,000 because not justified by the decedent’s lost income; the court did not
mention hedonic loss. See Lloyd Cohen, Toward an Economic Theory of the Measurement of Damages in
a Wrongful Death Action, 34 Emory L.J. 295, 307 (1985).
38
The data are from the Jury Verdict and Settlements, Combined database in Lexis. This data set appears to
have been generated from various local verdict and settlement reporting services, whose selection methods
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Civil Justice System data set that contains little information about the characteristics of
cases (“CJS”).39
Table 1 provides some examples from the JVS data set; these examples are
selected to show the range of real world outcomes.
Table 1: Tort Values of Life
Case
Satcherwhite v. San Bernandino City
Unified Sch. Dist.
Romero v. West Valley Sch. Dist.
Scurlock v. Twin Labs, Inc.
Braun v. CH Franciscan Shared
Laboratories, Inc.
Cook v. Newman
Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc.
Anonymous v. Anonymous
Brown v. LaFontaine-Rish Medical
Associates
Tengler v. Preferred Unlimited, Inc.
Solis v. Fiatallis North America, Inc.
Smith v. Antoine
Huertero v. Wersching
Ventura v. Lipton
Davis v. Ponce
Ojeda v. Shropshire
Riley v. Giroux
Tipp v. Dow Chemical Co.
Domback v. Kubsch
Stolarz v. St. Francis Medical Center
Ebel v. Berkowitz
Egan v. Mercy Health Corp. of
Southestern PA
Holmes v. Harris
Mendola v. Witkowski

State

Year

CA

2002

WA
TX

Award40

2003
2003

Facts
school playground accident (11
years old)
school bus accident (5 years old)
products liability (drug)

$1.8 million
$2 million

WI

2003

medical malpractice (lab delay)

$650,000

MO
TN
OH

2002
2002
2002

medical malpractice
police brutality
malpractice (9 months old)

NY

2003

malpractice (anesthesia)

IL
TX
TX
CA
NY
TX
TX
FL
TX
WI
CT
PA

1999
2003
2003
2003
1999
2003
2002
2003
2001
2004
2003
2003

automobile accident
worksite accident
dram shop (9 years old)
police error (18 months old)
malpractice
firefighter death in arson
malpractice
malpractice
workplace—asbestos
malpractice
malpractice
malpractice

PA

2003

malpractice

DC
NY

2003
2002

auto accident (81 years old)
railroad-auto accident (77 years old)

$500,000

$3 million
$4.4 million
$7.5 million
$365,000
$18.2 million41
$12 million
$276,000
$2.1 million
$15 million
$506,000
$1 million
$750,000
$9 million
$198,500
$7.8 million
$2.9 million
$125,000
$1.75 million
$10,00042

are not disclosed. Thus, it is unsafe to assume that the data are randomly generated, and indeed Lexis
explicitly disclaims that they are.
39
The data were generated by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Data and
other information are available online at: http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD-STUDY/
03957.xml. The website includes information on verdicts and settlements of tort lawsuits between January
and December 2001 from the 75 largest counties in the United States. These data were randomly generated.
40
We do not include punitive damages, pain and suffering damages, medical expenses, past income, and so
forth, so this category is an attempt to determine the implicit valuation of the loss of life itself. Thus, we do
include (after death) losses to dependents, both economic and noneconomic.
41
The driver was high on drugs; we suspect that in this case, as in other high award cases, the damages
included a punitive element, even though not classified as such.
42
Classified as “pecuniary costs”; it is not clear what this means.
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In the JVS data set, the mean award for loss of life—meaning, usually, lost
income to dependents or the estate, or mental distress to dependents (we tried to exclude
punitive damages, damages for pain and suffering of the victim prior to death, medical
expenses, funeral expenses, and so forth)—was $3.1 million, and the median was $1.1
million. This is roughly consistent with the findings of the CJS survey, in which the mean
was about $3,759,000 and the median was $961,000 for a sample of cases from 2001.43
Thus, the CJS survey suggests that the JVS survey may be reasonably reliable.44 In any
event, it seems clear enough that when outliers are excluded, the tort system values lost
lives at well under $3 million, and about half the time under $1 million.45 We suspect that
the real amounts are somewhat lower; the evidence suggests that awards generally
decline during post-verdict proceedings.46 The considerable variance in both data sets
also supports the conventional wisdom that the damage awards have a degree of
arbitrariness, that is, they are not closely tied to the underlying concerns of the tort
system and are also erratic and unpredictable.47

43

Thomas H. Cohen & Steven K Smith, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, Bureau of
Justice Statistics Bulletin, April 2004, NCJ 202803, at p. 10.
44
Another data set was created by Jury Verdict Research, which claims, or appears to claim, that the data
set is reliable. See Current Award Trends in Personal Injury (43rd ed. 2004). Statistics for 2002 jury awards
(not settlements) are: median $1.6 million; mean $4.7 million; low of $5,809 and high of $100 million. Id.,
at 6. Note that these awards would include such (for us) irrelevant elements as punitive damages. And see
Viscusi’s figures, generated from an earlier Jury Verdict Research data set, which show the same pattern.
See W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 108-09 (1991).
45
We should note the problem of selection effects. Parties may be more likely to settle cases that are likely
to produce high awards both because of risk aversion and of the likely higher litigation costs in high stakes
cases. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A
Comment on Eisenberg et al., 26 J. Legal Stud. 663, 668 (1997). To be sure, verdicts and settlements data
includes settlements, and the settlements are lower than the verdicts; however, this may reflect the
plaintiff’s risk of losing, a risk that is absent for verdicts. Still, all this means, for our purposes, is that there
is a lot of unexplained variance in the cases: if some high amount, X, is the “real” level of damages for loss
of life, then why are so many verdicts so much lower?
46
See, e.g., Ivy E. Broder, Characteristics of Million Dollar Awards: Jury Verdicts and Final
Disbursements, 11 Just. Sys. J. 349 (1986) (finding that plaintiffs ultimately received about 57 percent of
the verdict); Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of
Those Awards, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 265 (finding reductions of about 7 to 60 percent in different
jurisdictions).
47
The standard deviation for the JVS data set is $6.1 million, with a minimum of $0 and a maximum of $50
million. We do find it difficult to believe that the data were selected because of their variance, however, so
the variance may be reliable (or else it just reflects gaps and inaccuracies in the data, e.g., treating punitive
damages as if they were economic loss damages). In the CJS data set, the standard deviation is $11.7
million, with a minimum of $705 and a maximum of $120 million, according to our own calculations. For
analysis of product liability cases, See W. Kip Viscusi,, International Review of Law and Economics
(1988); W. Kip Viscusi, J. Legal Studies (1988); W. Kip Viscusi, J. Legal Studies (1986).
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Hence two points emerge from the wrongful death cases. The first is that in
principle, the law calls for a highly individuated approach, one that recognizes a wide
range of factors that bear on the degree of loss to dependents. The second is that in
practice, actual awards on account of loss of life are usually well below $3 million and
also characterized by great variance.
B. How Regulatory Policy Values Loss of Life
As we have noted, agencies now assign monetary values to human lives. The
practice is recent, having become systematized only as a result of an executive order from
1981.48 For a period, agency figures were highly and inexplicably variable.49 With some
exceptions, however, most regulatory agencies have now converged on a fairly narrow
range for the valuation of life: $5 million to $6.5 million. Consider the following table,
accounting for agency valuations in the recent past:
Table 2: Agency Values of Life, 1996–2003
Agency
Dept of Transportation/Federal
Motor Carrier Safety
Administration

Dept. of Health & Human
Services/FDA

Dept. of Agriculture Food Safety
and Inspection Service

Dept. of Health & Human
Services/FDA

Office of Management and Budget

Regulation and Date
Safety Requirements for Operators of Small
Passenger-Carrying Commercial Motor Vehicles
Used in Interstate Commerce
August 12, 2003
68 FR 47860-01
Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition
Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health
Claims
July 11, 2003
68 FR 41434-01
Control of 1Listeria Monocytogenes in Readyto-Eat Meat and Poultry Products
June 6, 2003
68 FR 34208-01
Labeling Requirements for Systemic Antibacterial Drug Products Intended for Human Use
February 6, 2003
68 FR 6062-01
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of
Federal Regulations
February 3, 2003
68 FR 5492-01

48

Value of
Statistical Life

$3 million

$6.5 million

$4.8 million

$5 million

$5 million

See Exec. Ord. 12291, Fed. Reg. (1981). For discussion of the origins of cost-benefit balancing in federal
regulation, see Richard Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1
(1995).
49
See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are
Distorted, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1105 (2000)
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EPA

EPA

EPA

EPA

EPA

EPA

EPA

Dept. of Transportation/FAA

Dept. of Health & Human
Services/FDA

Dept. of Health & Human
Services/FDA

Dept. of Agriculture/Food Safety &
Inspection Service

Control of Emissions from Nonroad Large
Spark-Ignition Engines, and Recreational
Engines (Marine & Land-Based)
November 8, 2002
67 FR 68242-01
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations:
Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and
New Source Contaminants Monitoring
January 22, 2001
66 FR 6976-01
Control of Air Pollution from New Motor
Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur
Control Requirements
January 18, 2001
66 FR 5002-01
Control of Air Pollution from New Motor
Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions
Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control
Requirements
February 10, 2000
65 FR 6698-01
Findings of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking on Section 125 Petitions for
Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone
Transport
January 18, 2000
65 FR 2674-01
Final Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Hazardous Waste Combustors
September 30, 1999
64 FR 52828-01
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations:
Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts
December 16, 1998
63 FR 69390-01
Financial Responsibility Requirements for
Licensed Launch Activities
August 26, 1998
63 FR 45592-01
Quality Mammography Standards
October 28, 1997
62 FR 55852-01
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution
of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect
Children and Adolescents
August 28, 1996
61 FR 44396-01
Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems
July 25, 1996
61 FR 38806-01
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$6 million

$6.1 million

$6 million

$5.9 million

$5.9 million

$5.6 million

$5.6 million

$3 million

$2 - 3 million

$2.5 million

$1.6 million

Dept. of Transportation/FAA

Consumer Product Safety
Commission
Consumer Product Safety
Commission

Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in Pilot Training,
Testing and Checking and at Training Centers
July 2, 1996
61 FR 34508-01
Requirements for Labeling of Retail Containers
of Charcoal
May 3, 1996
61 FR 19818-01
Large Multiple-Tube Fireworks Devices
March 26, 1996
61 FR 13084-01

$2.7 million

$5 million

$3 - $7 million

What is the source of these numbers? The answer involves real-world markets,
producing evidence of compensation levels for actual risks.50 In the workplace and for
consumer goods, additional safety has a price; market evidence is investigated to identify
that price.51 Agency valuations are largely a product of studies of actual workplace risks,
attempting to determine how much workers are paid to assume mortality hazards.52 The
relevant risks usually are in the general range of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000.53 The calculation
of the value of a statistical life is a product of simple arithmetic. Suppose that workers
must be paid $600, on average, to eliminate a risk of 1/10,000. If so, the value of a
statistical life would be said to be $6 million. Additional information comes from
contingent valuation studies, asking people how much they are willing to pay to reduce
statistical risks of death.54 But studies of this kind are not the foundation of agency
policies in the domain of mortality risks, apparently on the theory that real-world
evidence is more reliable.
Several features of agency practice are noteworthy by way of comparison to
wrongful death actions. The most obvious is that agencies provide a uniform number;
they make no effort to individuate, even though more individuation would not be
50

See W. Kip Viscusi, supra.
A valuable and comprehensive overview can be found in W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value
of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. Risk and
Uncertainty 5 (2003).
52
See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs, supra note, for discussion.
53
See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates With Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42
Econ. Inquiry 29, 33 (2004) (showing fatality risks ranging from about 1/100,000 to 45/100,000).
54
See, e.g., James Hammitt and Jin-Tau Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the Value of
Mortality Risk, 28 J. Risk and Uncertainty 73 (2004); George Tolley et al., Valuing Health For Policy
(1995); Valuing Environmental Preferences (Ian Bateman & K. G. Willis eds., 1999); Peter Diamond &
Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No Number, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 45, 4952 (1994); Note, Ask A Silly Question, 105 Harv L Rev 1981 (1992).
51
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difficult. In addition, agencies use a higher (average) value for loss of life to the victim
but place no value on losses to spouses, friends, and others who suffer a welfare loss,
economic and otherwise, in the event of death. The uniform numbers, refusing to make
inquiries that would lead to less uniformity or that would be difficult to administer, are
not surprising in light of the comparative youth of regulatory valuation and in light of the
controversial nature of imaginable distinctions. More accurate, and more complex,
valuations might be expected to follow an initial period in which assignment of some
number of statistical lives becomes entrenched. But these points raise the theoretical
questions that bear on both judicial and administrative practice.
C. A Comparison: The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund
As we mentioned at the outset, the September 11 Fund was influenced by tort
principles, and it is instructive to compare the awards to dependents of deceased victims
of the September 11 attacks both with tort wrongful death awards and with agency
valuations of life. Table 3 displays the comparison.
Table 3: Tort, Sept. 11 Fund, and Agency Valuations of Life
System
Tort
Sept. 11

Mean

Median

Minimum

Maximum

Standard
Deviation

$3.8 million

$961,000

$0

$50 million

$6.1 million

$2.0 million

$1.7 million

$250,000

$7.1 million

$1.4 million

55

Agency
$5. 4 million
$5.9 million
$3 million
$6.5 million
$1.0 million
56
Note: Tort awards from the CJS data set (2001); Sept. 11 awards from Fund Website; agency valuations
from Table 2 (post-2000). The Sept. 11 data are based on amounts received after deductions for life
insurance payments, and the like; they therefore understate true valuations, probably by a few hundred
thousand dollars.57

The Sept. 11 fund has a higher median but lower mean than the tort system does.
The lower mean is due to the lack of extreme awards characteristic of the tort system.
The higher median is probably due to two factors: (1) inflation from 2001 to 2004; and
55

The agency statistics cannot be straightforwardly compared to the statistics for the other systems, because
the former will vary depending on the relative size of the populations that the different regulations affect.
Still, they give a general sense of the differences.
56
Available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments_deceased.html. The website provides
the mean, median, and range; we calculated the standard deviation from the raw data (also provided by the
website).
57
See the examples provided at: http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/award_summaries.pdf. We
have been unable to find the appropriate statistics.
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(2) the much higher average income of the September 11 victims compared to that of the
general population. Putting aside the outliers, then, the Sept. 11 Fund and tort awards
seem largely consistent, and both are much lower than agency valuations. What the Sept.
11 Fund shares with agency valuations is the much lower degree of variance than that
found in the tort system.
II. Theory: Why Should Loss of Life Be Valued?
Many people believe that a human life is uniquely precious and therefore cannot
be given a monetary valuation.58 Calculating the value of a human life demeans the
victim of the wrong rather than vindicating his memory. The intuition is understandable.
But for purposes of law and policy, what is the alternative? Awarding zero damages for
wrongful death is hardly less demeaning, and an award of an “arbitrary” amount of
money—either the jury or the legislature should pick a number out of thin air—is no
better. Similarly, it is hard to believe that regulatory policy should assume that human life
is worth nothing or, alternatively, that it has some arbitrary value.
To understand how loss of life should be valued, we need to understand the social
purposes such a practice would advance. There is no acontextual method for assigning
monetary values to mortality and mortality risks. We start with tort law, which is
conventionally said to have two goals: deterrence and compensation.59 Then we turn to
regulatory policy, which shares tort law’s goal of deterrence.
A. Tort Law and Deterrence
1. Principles of Tort Damages
The tort system has two purposes: compensation and deterrence. Frequently, but
not always, the two purposes lead in similar directions. If the victim of a wrongful death
action cannot be compensated, deterrence is still a possibility. The question we now
investigate is what level of damages produces optimal deterrence of wrongful death. Our
basic conclusion is that two approaches are formally equivalent and will accomplish that
task: a monetary amount, before any harm occurs, that is the multiple of the magnitude of

58

See Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value
of Nothing (2004).
59
E.g., Erny v. Estate of Merola, 792 A.2d 1208, 1217 (N.J. 2002).
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the harm and its probability, assessed for every person who is made to face the relevant
risk; or a monetary amount, after the harm occurs, that reflects the magnitude of the
harm. The choice between the two approaches largely depends on questions of
administrability.60
To understand how deterrence works, one must take an ex ante perspective.61
Suppose that at time 1 the legal rules are chosen; at time 2 everyone chooses how to act
and what level of care to take; and at time 3 injuries and deaths occur, and liability and
damages are determined for wrongful death actions. On the deterrence approach, we want
to choose legal rules at time 1 that produce damages at time 3 that give everyone optimal
incentives at time 2.
As is well known, people can be given optimal incentives to take care if they are
required to pay damages for any financial losses that they cause (or negligently cause).62
Imagine, for example, that a particular behavior, such as driving, will cause $1000 in
losses if an accident occurs. A driver can control the probability that the loss will occur
by taking more or less care. The cost of care increases with the amount of care that is
taken. The efficient level of care is the amount at which the marginal cost of care equals
the expected marginal cost of an accident. By requiring the tortfeasor to pay damages, the
law forces the driver to internalize the losses that she creates, and so she will take
precautions when the costs of those precautions are less than the expected losses.63
We can think of the victim’s loss in two equivalent ways. We can say that the
victim incurs the cost of the accident, L, at time 3. In our example, L = $1000. This is the
“ex post” loss. Alternatively, we can say that the victim incurs an expected loss of pL at
60

There are also equitable issues here; from the equitable point of view, perhaps it is worse to compensate
everyone ex ante for risks than to compensate those for harm when those harms come to fruition (insurance
practices are obviously relevant to an evaluation). But our focus here is on deterrence, and we do not
engage those issues.
61
As should be apparent, we are not dealing here with intentional killings, as in cases of homicide. It is not
clear that the risk of being murdered should be analyzed in the same way as the risks ordinarily involved in
wrongful death cases, which typically involve negligence in one or another form. Difficult questions are
raised by the evident fact that people would be willing to pay different amounts to avoid statistically
identical risks: A 1/100,000 risk of a cancer death is different from a 1/100,000 risk of a sudden
unanticipated death (as we stress), and a 1/100,000 risk of being strangled, or of being killed in a terrorist
attack, would undoubtedly produce its own distinctive numbers.
62
To keep things simple, we assume throughout that only the tortfeasor can control the probability of an
accident. This allows us to focus on the optimal level of damages for loss of life. We also focus on optimal
incentives to take care, in which case the tort rule can be either strict liability or negligence.
63
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987); Steven Shavell,
Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987).
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time 1, where p is the probability of the accident at time 3. This is the “ex ante” loss.
From an economic perspective, these losses are equivalent. If an insurance market exists,
people are assumed to be indifferent between being awarded pL, as potential victims, at
time 1, and L, as actual victims, at time 3.64 Insurers will set the premium equal to pL,
and they will pay out L if the accident occurs. Tort law, in theory, could either require all
drivers to pay all potential tort victims pL at time 1, or (as in fact) only drivers who cause
accidents to pay only actual victims L at time 3. If the insurer is subrogated (as is usually
the case), then the victim is indifferent between these two systems, as is the insurer.
Potential victims who want insurance can use their “damages” of pL under the first
system to pay for the insurance premium, and simply collect from the driver under the
second system without going through the insurance intermediary. Potential victims who
do not want insurance could purchase an investment instrument that pays pL at time 1 in
return for the chance of L at time 3.65
Why does the tort system award damages of L to actual victims rather than
damages of pL to potential victims, when the two awards are equivalent? A large part of
the answer is one of practicality. Potential victims cannot be easily identified in advance,
and many risks are difficult or even impossible to calculate. In the unusual cases when
the reverse is true—when courts cannot award L to actual victims because the loss will
occur in the distant future—some courts have been willing to force potential tortfeasors
to pay potential victims damages equal to pL.66 Thus, tort law does not, in principle, bar
awards of pL rather than L; its focus on L stems from the fact that L is a far simpler
foundation for judicial decisions.
2. Valuing Loss of Life
Now let us turn to the problem of measuring L when the loss is death. To fix
intuitions, suppose that the (multiply unfortunate!) victim of the wrongful death tort has
no dependents, no spouse, no friends, and no income; suppose too that the death was
instant, involving no pain, suffering, dread, or medical expenses. Putting aside funeral

64

We put to one side some complexities with this assumption.
Cf. Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. Legal Stud. 203 (2002).
66
See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, U. Minn.
L. Rev. 1419-21 (forthcoming 2004) and citations therein (discussing tort cases that recognize torts for
increasing the risk of death).
65
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expenses, most courts would be required by law to award zero damages, which is a
serious puzzle.
How should we think about valuing the loss of life? One thought is that the loss of
life should be valued at infinity because most people would not accept any amount of
money in exchange for their lives. If L—the loss—is infinite, then the product pL is
infinite as well. But this answer mistakes the relevant inquiry, which involves
probabilities of death, not death itself. Designate a new variable R, which refers to the
amount a person is willing to pay to avoid a particular risk of death. When a new risk is
created—say, a new kind of manufacturing process creates new sources of pollution,
producing a new risk of 1/500,000 in the area—everyone who incurs this risk suffers a
loss of welfare, which can be measured as R. If the person can pay to avoid this risk—
say, by moving—then he will pay any amount of money up to R. R is thus the ex ante
payment to avoid the risk of death.
It is desirable for potential tortfeasors to take account of this loss, R, for the same
reason that it is desirable for them to take account of any other pecuniary or nonpecuniary
loss.67 This can be done in two ways. All potential tortfeasors can be required to pay R to
every potential victim (that is, all people who incur the new risk of death). Alternatively,
tortfeasors who actually cause the death of particular victims can be forced to pay an
amount of money only to those victims (their estates or dependents, or even to the state)
such that the expected cost for the potential tortfeasor is R.68 Assuming sufficient
information, that amount is easily calculated. If victims are willing to pay R in order to
avoid the risk, and the risk itself—that is, the probability of death, is q—then the proper
level of damages is R/q. For example, if potential victims are willing to pay $600 in order
to avoid the risk of death, and the risk of death is 1/10,000, then their estates or
67

We are not discussing the optimal liability rule; simply assume that such a rule is in place.
One or both methods have been discussed by various commentators. Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay
Comes of Age: Will the System Survive, 83 Northwestern U.L. Rev. 876 (1989); Andrew Jay McClurg, It’s
a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 57
(1990); Landes and Posner, supra, at 187-89, 263-69; Shavell, supra, at 234 & n.7; Cohen, supra, at 316-20;
Erin A. O'Hara, Hedonic Damages For Wrongful Death: Are Tortfeasors Getting Away With Murder?, 78
Geo. L.J. 1687 (1990); Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law , 91
Geo. L.J. 585 (2003). Arlen criticizes these methodologies, claiming that they require too much
information. See Jennifer Arlen, An Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for Wrongful Death, 60 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1113 (1985). Many articles defending the methodology, discussing aspects of it, or criticizing it are
collected in The New Hedonics Primer for Economists and Attorneys (John O. Ward and Thomas R.
Ireland eds., 2d ed. 1996).
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dependents should recover $6 million (at time 3). This is equivalent from the deterrence
perspective to the first alternative, that of forcing tortfeasors to pay all potential victims
$600 (at time 1).
The amount R/q—$6 million, in our example—is often called the value of a
statistical life (VSL), but it is important to see that the number is just a construct,
designed to represent the cost of being subject to the risk of death, and not the value of
human life in the ordinary sense. In fact the term “value of a statistical life,” though in
common use,69 is actually quite misleading. What is really involved is the assignment of
monetary values to death risks—an assignment of the sort that occurs, though almost
always without formal calculation, whenever people run risks or take steps to reduce the
risks that they face (as, for example, by purchasing smoke alarms or Volvos).
The point to understand is that in order to calculate optimal damages for wrongful
death, we do not need to ask how much welfare or utility a dead person has, or how much
welfare or utility declines when a person dies. From a deterrence perspective, it is
sufficient to focus on the decline in welfare that results when a person is subjected to the
risk of death. The assignment of a monetary value to mortality risks is an effort to ensure
that focus.
B. Tort Law and Compensation
In tort cases involving easily measured losses, the deterrence and compensation
goals are joined in an intuitively satisfying way. The tort victim who loses $1000 obtains
damages of $1000. The tort victim is fully compensated, and optimal deterrence is
achieved.70 In wrongful death cases, however, there appears to be a disjunction between
the compensation and the deterrence goals. The dead person cannot be compensated—she
is dead. Because of the compensatory focus of tort law, this may be the reason that courts
denied damages for wrongful death prior to the enactment of wrongful death and survival
statutes. Hence courts attempt to achieve the compensatory goals of modern tort law by
focusing on the losses of survivors. We think that the attempt is inadequate and that
courts can do much better.
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See, e.g., Viscusi and Aldy, supra.
Albeit only in simplified setting where the victim has no ability to reduce the probability of an accident
by taking care.

70

20

Although dead people cannot be compensated, it is incorrect to say that tort law
cannot, with respect to victims, achieve its compensation goal in the wrongful death
context. Compensation is possible in such cases once it is understood that the tort
involves imposition of the risk of death.71
To see why, imagine that courts adopted the alternative ex ante system of liability:
all potential tortfeasors pay damages equal to R to all potential victims in time 1. If this
were the normal system, then people would be compensated for being forced to undergo
heightened risks of death. They would be compensated in the same sense as workers who
are given hazard pay in return for voluntarily undertaking some risky task.72
Now consider the regular ex post system. By awarding the victim’s estate R/q, the
court does not compensate the victim in a straightforward sense: you cannot compensate
someone who is dead. But suppose that the victim has a life insurance policy, which
provides that the insurer is subrogated to any claims that the victim’s estate has in case of
wrongful death. In addition to getting the regular benefits of a life insurance policy, all
potential victims who have life insurance would receive R in the form of the reduction in
the life insurance premium. Because the insurer has the right to R/q in case of a wrongful
death, it will be able to pass on the cost reduction in the form of a certain premium
reduction. In short, the risky behavior imposes a cost of R on all potential victims at time
1, but at the same time all potential victims are compensated via the intermediation of an
insurance company at time 1.73 Thus, tort law can serve its compensatory function in
wrongful death cases, albeit in an indirect way and only with the help of a market
intermediary.74
To be sure, this is not what people usually mean by compensation in tort cases.
The usual notion is that if one person commits a wrongful act that injures another person,
71

We assume that there is no hedonic loss, such as dread, associated with the risk. If there is, then
additional compensation may be necessary. See Adler, supra.
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See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice (1983).
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Cf. Cohen, supra, at 338 (discussing a market in wrongful death actions).
74
A related literature discusses whether tort law should award damages for nonpecuniary losses such as
pain and suffering. Shavell argues that compensation for pain and suffering damages serves no insurance
purpose, because there is no reason to believe that the marginal value of a dollar for a person is higher
when he endures pain and suffering than when he does not. See Shavell, supra, at 228. For a contrasting
view, see Steven P. Croley and Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs Of Accidents: Pain-And-Suffering
Damages In Tort Law, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1785 (1995). In the case of death, the victim himself cannot be
insured against his own death in the sense of being made indifferent between life and death; life insurance
payouts are to dependents, not insureds.
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the wrongdoer should compensate the victim for the loss. This principle yields
straightforward legal results in ordinary cases. If the tortfeasor destroys the victim’s
automobile, then damages should equal the value of the automobile or the cost of
replacing it. Such damages would make the victim whole. However, damages cannot
compensate the victim of a wrongful death tort because the money has no value for a
person who is dead. On this view, courts’ refusal to award damages for loss of life is,
from a strictly compensatory perspective, correct.
To avoid this odd result, some scholars have suggested that a risk of death is a
harm; in their view, people should have a claim for tort damages if they are subjected to
risks of death.75 Others have expressed doubts about whether a risk can be a harm,76 but if
this debate is resolved in favor of the risk-is-harm view, then we are back to our earlier
claim: it is proper to award damages of R in case of risk imposition. We add only that
compensation can take the form of R/q in the case of death at time 3, as well as R for all
potential victims at time 1, as long as potential victims purchase insurance and insurance
premia adjust.
C. Regulatory Policy
1. Agencies and Deterrence.
With respect to valuing the loss of life, the implications of our deterrence
argument is the same for regulatory law as for tort law. In order to provide optimal
deterrence of behavior that cause a risk of death, the individual or firm that engages in
this behavior should internalize R, so long as we are not concerned with the potentially
negligent conduct of victims.77
As we have seen, tort principles suggest that the people who impose risks on
others should either pay R to all affected persons at time 1, or R/q to all actual victims at
time 3. As we noted above, nothing about deterrence theory requires that the payments go
to the potential victims or the estates or dependents of victims. For deterrence purposes,
payments could even go to the government. All that is important is that people know that
75
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they will have to pay for imposing risks on other people, and will have to pay an amount
equal to the victims’ willingness to pay to avoid the risk.78 Payment to victims, potential
victims, dependents, and estates may provide other kinds of incentives, such as the
incentive to bring lawsuits, and these incentives might be valuable, but they should be
kept separate at the theoretical level.
Federal regulations do not require firms to pay damages to people who are killed
as a result of their behavior. Instead, regulatory agencies direct firms to take precautions
that (in theory) are the precautions that the firms would take if they were subject to
(optimal) tort liability. If the firms fail to take these precautions, they are fined or
punished in some other way. To determine the optimal level of precautions, agencies
must perform on their own the calculations that tort law leaves to the potential tortfeasor.
Thus, when firms impose risks of death on people, agencies must value those risks, just
as in tort law. The analysis is the same as in tort theory. If a firm’s behavior increases the
risk of death by q, and people are willing to pay R to avoid that risk, then the firm should
be ordered to take precautions such that the joint costs of precautions and expected losses
are minimized. For example, if the firm’s activities impose a 1/10,000 risk on 1 million
people, and the cost of incurring the risk is $500 per person, then the firm is implicitly
causing harm of $500 million. One can conceptualize this equivalently as causing $500 of
harm to 1 million people or $5 million of harm to 100 people, those who actually die as a
result of the behavior. The regulatory agency uses these figures in a cost-benefit analysis:
if these costs are greater than the benefits from the firm’s activities, then the agency will
issue regulations that restrict the behavior of the firm and similar firms. In the regulatory
context, this is in fact the standard theory of valuation of statistical lives79 (what we
prefer to call valuation of statistical mortality risks).
Tort law and regulatory law, then, require decisionmakers to attach a value to R,
the amount of money a person will pay to avoid a risk of death. But R is not the only loss
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Or under negligence law, only if they do not take the cost-justified precautions. We also bracket the
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that is imposed when a person dies. We have briefly described the general approach to
the valuation of R; Part III goes into more detail.
2. Coordinating Judicial and Agency Behavior.
According to standard wisdom in law and economics, tort law and regulatory law
have redundant functions: both deter cost-unjustified behavior. Reliance on one rather
than the other should depend on their special investigation and enforcement advantages.80
In the regulatory context, a significant disadvantage is that agencies need a great deal of
information, on both the cost and the benefit side, to produce optimal regulations. By
contrast, damage rules for torts require courts to assess costs alone. If the two systems
overlap—if, as is often the case, they govern the same behavior—they may interact in
complex ways. If both systems are optimal, and as a result people would take appropriate
care if either were in place, the regulatory system will generate unnecessary
administrative costs and possibly excessive deterrence. Suppose, for example, that the
rules of tort liability and damages imposed the proper incentives; if so, there would be no
need for regulations, which could introduce distortions. Regulations are necessary largely
because many of those who are harmed by private conduct are unlikely to bring suit and
to receive compensation. In the context of air pollution, for example, chains of causation
are exceedingly difficult to trace, and those who fall prey to life-threatening or fatal
diseases are unlikely to know that pollution is responsible. Because of collective action
problems and informational deficits, tort law will not provide adequate incentives even if
it is optimally tailored.
We can clarify the problem by imagining the existence of a single agency, say the
Federal Compensation and Deterrence Agency (FCDA), with the task of ensuring optimal
deterrence and of compensating those who deserve it. Such an agency would avoid the
redundancy that is a possible outcome of parallel systems of tort law and agency
regulation. It would also see compensation as part of the provision of appropriate
incentives. If federal agencies acted like the FCDA, compensation would not be
necessary via the tort system. And if courts acted like the FCDA, compensating people
while creating proper incentives, there would be no need for agency regulations.
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So long as the two systems are in place, they should be designed so as to be
complementary—a task that has yet to be attempted and that we will not explore here. In
the real world, the existence of two systems is likely to be harmless, at least most of the
time. People who take cost-justified precautions avoid fines (from regulatory agencies)
and damage payments (from tort victims); people who take suboptimal precautions risk
both. In theory, then, people whose behavior is regulated by both systems will not be
overdeterred.81 If one system is optimal and the other is suboptimal, however, it is
important that the suboptimal system yield to the other; regulatory preemption may
accomplish this task when regulations impose the proper level of care and when tort
liability would distort incentives. 82
A more interesting difficulty arises when two activities that are partial (or full)
substitutes are regulated by different systems that rely on different valuations. Consider,
for example, automobile travel, which is mainly but not entirely regulated by the tort
system (regulations affect the design of cars and highways, too) and short-haul air travel,
which is mainly but not entirely regulated by agencies (tort law also matters, of course).
Suppose that agencies and tort law use reasonable but different life valuations. This may
distort incentives and cause people to substitute from driving to flying or vice versa. To
see why, focus on the valuation of lives of third parties (on the ground victims of air
crashes, pedestrians). If tort law values victims less than regulatory law, then—all else
equal—driving will be cheaper than flying. So some people who would otherwise prefer
to fly will drive instead. Even though both tort law and the agencies use valuations that
are within the reasonable range, it would be better if they both use the same valuation
than if they use different valuations, even if one must arbitrarily pick one number from
the range.
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This point suggests that it would be valuable for the federal government to create
an agency or commission that determines focal or recommended valuations, and urges
courts to adopt them, taking advantage of the willingness of courts to allow themselves to
be influenced by agency judgments in other contexts. Consider, for example, a Federal
Loss Valuation Commission, one that would set forth guidelines for determining the
value of loss of life, loss of spouse, grief, and so forth, for use by courts in tort cases and
by regulatory agencies in their cost-benefit analyses. The guidelines might or might not
be purely advisory, but in any event they would tend to bring about a greater uniformity
and also stimulate more systematic thinking about valuation of losses. But investigation
of this possibility would take us well beyond our central concerns here.
III. What Is the Value of the Loss of Life?
A. General Issues
We have seen that agency practices grow out of real-world evidence involving
labor markets. In principle, this is a reasonable start under the framework we are
elaborating. Regulators are attempting to produce the optimal level of deterrence by
reference to actual market valuation of statistical risks. Nonetheless, serious questions
might be raised about the use of these studies by EPA and other agencies.
1. Uniform Numbers or Variable Numbers
The underlying studies of market behavior show significant variety in the crucial
figures, ranging from $0.7 million, in 1997 dollars, to $16.3 million.83 Recently OMB
stressed that a “substantial majority of the resulting estimates of VSL vary from roughly
$1 million to $10 million per statistical life.”84 The EPA has adopted the $6.1 million
figure on the ground that it represents the median in the relevant studies.85 But there is a
risk of arbitrariness in fastening on that median figure, certainly if we lack reason to
believe that the relevant study is the most accurate. In fact a more general look at the
VSL data produces further puzzles and wider ranges. Some studies find no compensating
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differentials at all, indicating a VSL of zero86—implausibly low, to say the least, for
purposes of policy. Others find that non-unionized workers receive negative
compensating differentials for risk, that is, they appear to be paid less because they face
mortality risks.87 Another study finds that African-Americans receive no significant
compensating wage differential and hence that their particular VSL is zero.88 On the other
hand, it is possible to find studies finding a VSL not below the range in Table 2 but above
it; consider the finding that for people who choose jobs with low level risks, the VSL is
as much as $22 million.89 The most recent meta-study, far more comprehensive than
EPA’s own analysis, finds that most studies produce a range of between $3.8 million and
$9 million.90 An obvious issue is the grounds for these nontrivial differences.
2. Worker Ignorance
A different objection would point to worker ignorance. Perhaps workers are
unaware of the risks that they are running. If so, the labor market studies do not really
show how workers are trading off risks for money, and hence they are essentially useless.
This objection cannot be simply dismissed. But current agency practice depends on the
judgment that the numerous studies of risk premiums indicate that sufficient numbers of
workers are informed to establish a “price” for additional increments of safety.91 If that
judgment is incorrect, then the current numbers need to be rethought, on the ground that
labor markets do not show informed tradeoffs between money and statistical risks. Under
the current theory, the regulators’ task would be to use other tools, perhaps contingent
valuation studies, to establish those tradeoffs.
3. Worker Coercion
Do workers voluntarily trade risks for dollars? An obvious objection would be
that many of the relevant workers have few options, and hence their market behavior—
trading off a risk of 1/10,000, say, for an apparently low sum—is in an important sense
involuntary.92 If taken as a normative claim about voluntariness, the claim may be right:
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When people have few or bad options, their choices might not count as voluntary. But if
taken as an objection to VSL studies, the claim is less helpful. Under the theory that we
have outlined, the question is how much people are willing to pay to eliminate specified
risks. Of course people are willing to pay less, for risk reduction, if they have less to pay.
Note also that the VSL numbers for workers are not radically different from the
corresponding numbers generated by purchases of cars, housing, and so forth93—a fact
that weakens the suggestion that coercion lies behind the employment figures.
In any case government does workers no favors by requiring them to “buy” more
health protection than they want. Suppose, for example, that workers are generally
willing to accept $600 to run a risk of 1/10,000. If an agency bans that deal, and forbids
workers from running that risk at that price, it will not improve workers’ welfare. This is
simply a specific example of the general proposition that when people’s circumstances
lead them to make harsh deals, they are usually not helped when government blocks
those deals. Of course the analysis would be different when those who receive the
benefits of regulation do not also pay for it.94
4. Uniformity and Individuation
Agency regulations use a single value for a statistical life, but a moment’s
reflection should be enough to show that by the very theory that agencies now use, this is
a blunder.95 There are several problems here.
First, people will almost certainly show a large difference in the dollar value of
statistically identical mortality risks.96 Would people really show the same VSL for
1/100,000 risks of deaths from lung cancer, car crashes, plane crashes, strokes, and
Alzheimer’s disease? An affirmative answer would be extremely surprising, and a great
deal of evidence suggests otherwise. The American economy contains a wide range of
occupations and industries, and a uniform VSL should not be expected to emerge from
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each of them. Indeed, a recent study finds significant differences across both occupations
and industries,97 with blue collar workers showing a higher VSL than others.98
It is inevitable that a wide range of values would emerge from studies that looked
separately at machine operators, executive positions, sales, dental technicians, equipment
cleaners, security guards, and secretaries99—and undoubtedly diverse values could be
found within each category. In addition, many risks controlled by the EPA are
qualitatively different from the workplace risks that EPA has used to generate its VSL.
There is considerable evidence that the risks associated with cancer produce a higher
WTP than other kinds of risk.100 For example, Hammit and Liu find that in Taiwan,
willingness to pay to eliminate a cancer risk is about one-third larger than WTP to avoid a
risk of a similar, chronic degenerative disease.101 The “cancer premium” might be
produced by the “dread” nature of cancer; it seems well-established that dreaded risks
produce special social concern, holding the statistical risk constant.102
Second, both individuals and groups should be expected to show significant
differences in their VSL. This is partly because they are risk-averse or risk-inclined, and
partly because of differences in terms of both wealth and income. Continuing national
income growth means that studies from the 1970s, on which agencies now rely,
understate VSL. 103 Equally important, risk reduction programs that are aimed at wealthy
populations should, under the prevailing theory, produce a higher VSL than similar
programs aimed at poor populations. Those who have a great deal of resources will
naturally show a higher VSL than those with little. According to the theory that now
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animates regulatory practice, agencies should use a VSL that corresponds to the actual
number for the population at stake.
This point has numerous implications. The workplace studies on which agencies
currently rely involve people with income that is below the population-wide median; to
that extent, the numbers are too low as applied to a population that is more representative
of the nation as a whole. Agency distinctions between wealthy and poor populations
would undoubtedly be quite controversial, but they are required by the very theory that
agencies currently use. Less controversially, recent evidence suggests that older people
show a lower VSL than younger people,104 and that distinction might well be
incorporated into regulatory policy.
The general conclusion is that use of WTP has a plausible logic to it, that variable
numbers make far more sense than uniform ones, and that the real question involve
information and administrability. Regulatory programs often affect thousands or even
millions of people at the same time, and full individuation is therefore impossible. A rule
that calls for minimum levels of air quality cannot provide air quality that is perfectly
calibrated to each person’s WTP. Nonetheless, agencies could certainly move in the
direction of greater individuation. So long as the WTP figures are accurate, government
does well to begin with them. Exactly the same is true for courts in wrongful death
actions.
B. Dependents
Tort law generally awards dependents the portion of the victim’s future income
that would have supported those dependents if the victim had lived a normal life, plus
sometimes an amount for grief, distress, and loss of companionship.105 Regulatory policy
usually ignores the loss to dependents.106 What is the proper treatment?
An act that kills a breadwinner harms dependents in two ways. First, the
dependants feel grief or emotional distress. Second, the dependents are deprived of
support—a source of income. It is possible, of course, that people’s WTP incorporates
both of these harms—that when a worker, for example, is WTP $60 to eliminate a risk of
104
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1/100,000, a portion of that figure reflects the worker’s desire to reduce the losses of
those who depend on him. For this to be so, however, workers would have to be pure
altruists as well as aware of the universe of losses, and we believe that it would be heroic
to assume that the WTP figures fully incorporate those losses. The extent to which they
do so is an empirical question on which information is absent. Grief and lost income raise
quite different issues, and so we discuss them separately.
1. Grief
When a person dies, his dependents such as his spouse and children are likely to
feel grief. Grief is a welfare loss, and potential tortfeasors should take this loss into
account as well as more conventional losses. Although grief will be felt by many
nondependents as well, including friends and adult children, and grief felt by these people
are welfare losses as well, we will confine our attention to dependents, for whom the
emotional distress is likely to be particularly acute.
One reason for excluding grief is the difficulty of monetizing it. How can the
WTP for grief be determined? The very question might seem absurd. Although it is easy
to imagine contingent value questions that ask, “How much are you willing to pay today
so that you would not feel grief if a loved one died at some time in the future?”, we
suspect that people would have difficulty answering this question. Even though people
see grief as a welfare loss, and all things equal would prefer to avoid it, they might think
that they ought to feel grief if a loved one dies, and in any case they would find it
exceptionally difficult or even impossible to monetize the value of not feeling grief.
Other contingent valuation questions seem more promising. For example, people might
be asked, “How much are you willing to pay to avoid having your spouse be subjected to
a risk of 1/50,000?” This question, whose answer should incorporate anticipated grief, is
not fundamentally different from others that are taken seriously in the context of
regulatory policy.107 But contingent valuation studies generally face serious questions of
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reliability,108 and the valuation of risks faced by loved ones faces those questions in
unusually acute form.
A better approach might be to find proxies. Consider, for example, the problem of
valuing the grief felt from the death of a spouse. Studies show that married people are
happier than unmarried people, and that part of this happiness is in part a result of
emotional closeness and companionship.109 Although the work is not at an advanced
stage, it suggests that the difference between the happiness of a married person and a
widowed person can be quantified using simple scales based on subjective assessments of
one’s emotional well-being.110 To derive a WTP to avoid grief from a spouse’s death, one
would need to (1) determine the average length of time that the grief persists (for
example, until remarriage); (2) find an equivalent happiness difference in an area of life
that has been reliably monetized (for example, WTP to avoid disease or depression), and
convert this difference into annual units; (3) multiply (1) and (2).
A very crude estimate can be made from a recent study. This study shows that a
person who is married has the level of self-reported happiness equivalent to that felt by a
widowed person who receives an extra $100,000 per year (in 1990 dollars) but is
otherwise equivalent.111 If the average number of years before remarriage or the “natural”
termination of the original marriage (from divorce, or normal mortality) is, say, 5 years,
then the welfare loss is equivalent to about $500,000 (or closer to $400,000 with
discounting). We emphasize that this figure is meant for illustrative purposes, both
because the methodology is different from the standard VSL methodology and because
the methodology is very new and at an early stage of testing and development. In
addition, the study does not quite capture grief; if it captures anything, it is the monetary
108
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equivalent of the welfare reduction from not having a spouse (a number that may be
larger or smaller than grief because of the wrongful death of a spouse). Still, the study
shows that the amounts under consideration are not trivial, and indeed will be much
higher when the decedent has multiple dependents—children as well as a spouse.
Whatever the flaws of this method, it is likely to be superior to the current
alternatives. Regulatory law implicitly treats this WTP as equal to zero, which cannot be
right. Tort law leaves this question to the jury, which, without any guidance, is likely to
produce amounts that are unreliable, unpredictable, or both. Jurors must engage in a
difficult enterprise of translating grief into monetary equivalents and in any case rely on
their lay judgments, which studies suggest are systematically incorrect. For example,
people tend to think that victims of traumas never fully recover their sense of well-being,
when in fact the grief or mental distress that results form such traumas usually dissipates
after a few years.112 We conclude that some amount for grief should be included in both
jury awards and regulatory assessments of the loss associated with mortality risks. Any
particular number has a degree of arbitrariness, but on the basis of current evidence,
$500,000 would not be the worst place to start.
2. Lost Support
When a person dies, dependents are deprived of the portion of the victim’s
income and resources that were used for their benefit. It is tempting to think that the
monetized welfare loss—the dependent’s WTP to avoid loss of support—is equivalent to
the lost support, but this is not likely to be true.
To see why, imagine a two person household consisting of H and W. W is the
breadwinner, and H takes care of the house. W makes $50,000 per year. Suddenly, W is
killed. What amount of money is necessary to compensate H for the loss of support?
The answer is not $50,000 per year (that is, a lump sum of something like $1
million). It is quite possible that many people in the position of H will now get a job that
earns, say, $30,000 per year. Most Hs are not likely to be better off than they were before
from a purely financial perspective, but it would be wrong to say that they are $50,000
worse off. The new one-person household receives only $20,000 less per year, and H
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does not share his income with W. H must work now, and perhaps he must pay someone
to clean the house, but he also does not have to perform household services that partly
benefit W, as he did before W’s death.
Even if H cannot work (suppose he is disabled), the right answer is probably not
$50,000. For one thing, W may devote only a small portion of her income to the support
of H. Perhaps she spends $40,000 for herself, and only $10,000 for him. On the other
side, W may invest significant uncompensated work into supporting H: for example, she
cooks for him. The former consideration suggests that $50,000 is too high, the latter
consideration that $50,000 is too low.
We can even imagine extreme situations, where the dependent is made better off
(financially) by the breadwinner’s death. Suppose that a parent neglects his children, and
gives them inadequate food and clothing. The parent dies and the children are moved to
the home of relatives or to a foster home, where they receive adequate food and clothing.
From the perspective of financial support (but not necessarily emotional well being), the
children are better off, not worse off; the loss of support caused by the death is zero.
These examples suggest that a high degree of individuation is appropriate for judgments
about loss of support; no uniform number could possibly make sense. For regulators,
dealing with populations rather than individuals, it would be necessary to assess the
population-wide mean for the relevant beneficiaries.
How should loss of support be calculated? Consider first the death of a spouse in
a family that has no children. As a matter of theory, a sensible approach would be to
determine the economies of scale from household production.113 Consider two people
who have separate households; let their annual joint costs be C. Now the two people set
up a single household; their annual joint costs drop to C’ because one kitchen is cheaper
than two, and so forth. As a first approximation, ½(C–C’) would be the annual (financial)
cost to one person from the death of the other. If on average, it takes a person X years to
set up a new household after the death of a spouse, then the financial cost is ½X(C–C’).
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This figure can be derived from existing studies that look at the financial cost of
divorce.114
When children exist, the calculations are more complex. If one of two parents
dies, then the children are deprived of the victim’s investment in childcare. This amount
can be roughly monetized by using market data for the cost of nannies and the like. If a
single parent dies, or both parents die, the children must be moved to a new family.
Foster parents receive a subsidy from the state; this is a first approximation of the
financial burden, and ought to be borne by the tortfeasor or regulated entity. Friends or
relatives who take the children in also will incur extra expenses, for which they ought to
be compensated, except limited by any economies of scale (a third child will probably
require less financial support at the margin than a first or second child).
Tort law sometimes attempts to handle these complex problems, but imperfectly.
In the jurisdictions with the most sophisticated rules, the courts award only a portion of
the decedent’s lost income to the dependents, after subtracting expenses and the future
consumption of the decedent. The September 11th Compensation Fund also takes this
approach. As we have noted, lost income is not likely to be the same as the monetized
welfare loss.
Regulatory policy entirely ignores lost support. This would not be a wholly
indefensible approach if WTP studies implicitly incorporated the subjects’ expectation of
lost support for their dependents in case of death.115 A worker who demands a risk
premium for hazardous work might do so in part so that he can purchase extra insurance
for his dependents. The WTP figure, then, reflects not only the worker’s hedonic loss of
life, but the worker’s welfare loss from expected lost support for dependents.116 The
problem is that the WTP will not fully reflect the lost support if the breadwinner is not
fully altruistic (and full altruism is rare) or if he does not think carefully about the needs
of his dependents in the case of his death. We think that the approach we outlined above
makes more sense. The adjustment, for the regulatory context, comes from the fact that
114

See, e.g., Robert S. Weiss, The Impact of Marital Dissolution on Income and Consumption in Singleparent Households, 46 J. Marriage & the Family 115 (1984); Karen C. Holden and Pamela J. Smock, The
Economic Costs of Marital Dissolution: Why Do Women Bear a Disproportionate Cost?, 17 Ann. Rev.
Soc. 51 (1991).
115
A similar point can be made about agencies’ neglect of grief.
116
In fact Viscusi has found that when workers’ compensation benefits are high, workers do accept a wage
offset. See XX.

35

regulations necessarily protects large numbers of people, and hence estimates for the
relevant population are inevitable. What is hard to defend is the complete exclusion of
lost support from current regulatory practice.
How much should regulatory agencies value the loss to dependents? Our
argument above suggests that the value should be the lost household economies of scale
until a new two-person household can be created. For two-person households, this is the
extra cost (or lower benefits) that result when a person moves from a two-person
household to a one-person household.
As an illustration, imagine that the two-person household has a joint income of
$50,000 both before and after separation, but that living costs increase by $5,000 for each
person; and that, on average, each person could form a new two-person household three
years after the termination of the old one. Now suppose instead that one person dies; the
loss of support for the other person is $5,000 per year for three years, her extra
expense.117 Although we have not tried to determine the actual amount, given current
levels of income, household economies, and so forth, we suspect that the right amount
will be in the thousands or perhaps tens of thousands of dollars per death.
C. Children
Because of its traditional focus on loss of income, tort law ought to produce low
numbers for the loss of a child’s life. Children lack dependents; therefore, tortfeasors who
kill children are not required to pay damages on account of loss of support in loss-todependents states. Whether the actual awards are lower for children than for adults is a
hard question, given the discretion of the jury, and we do not have a full answer, though
existing data provide some clues.118 By contrast, regulatory policy treats the life of a child
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and the life an adult as equivalent, although if agencies used VSLYs, a child’s life would
be valued at a higher amount because the child has a longer life expectancy.119 What is
the proper treatment?
1. Parental Judgments
One possibility is to rely on parental judgments. A recent study attempts to
determine the VSL of children by examining the market for bicycle safety helmets for
children. Bicycle safety helmets reduce the probability of death by about 4/1,000,000 per
year for children between the ages of 5 and 9, and 6/1,000,000 for children between the
ages of 10-14. In 1997, the annualized cost of a helmet was about $6.51. The authors
found that, given market data on the willingness of parents to buy helmets, the median
parent implicitly attributed a VSL of $2.7 million for children between 5 and 9, and $2.6
million for children between 10 and 14; by contrast, the VSL for the adults who bought
helmets for themselves was $4.0 million (1997 dollars).120
The problem with the study is that it does not even purport to show how much
children are willing to pay to reduce the risk of death; it shows what adults are willing to
pay to reduce the risk of death to their children. The parent’s WTP for avoiding a child’s
death is not a good proxy for the child’s welfare loss because parents are not pure
altruists and are willing to trade off their children’s risk of death against other things such

any comparisons can be drawn. Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and Public
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males $1.2 million and $4.9 million (compare figures for adult females and minor females). What is
striking here is that the mean for children is higher but the median is lower; the reason why can be seen in
the maximum in each case: $55.4 million for adult males and $328 million [sic!] for minor males. As noted,
these figures include punitive damages, and we suspect that, although on average juries value children less
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as their own utility from consumption.121 If we wanted to find out how children value
mortality risks, we would need to look at the children’s own attitudes and behavior; but
children do not usually have income, rarely make their own decisions about purchasing
safety equipment, and have poor judgment about risks. For these reasons, a study that
attempted to tease out children’s WTP to avoid risks would tell us little or nothing about
the welfare loss from a child’s death. If a ten-year-old child is willing to pay $1 to avoid a
risk of 1/10,000, we would know nothing about how tort law and regulatory policy
should value his death.
2. Children and welfare
What should be done? The touchstone is welfare loss, and a child loses welfare as
a result of death. Thus, we should assign some WTP for a child’s death. Some
arbitrariness cannot be avoided, but one possibility is to follow current practice and to use
the standard, uniform VSL used for adults. This approach has the advantage of not being
clearly inferior to the alternatives. Another approach would be to take the VSLY for
adults, and multiply it by the expected number of years of life. This approach is
consistent with the general interest, in many circles, in focusing on statistical life-years as
well as or in addition to statistical lives.122 Yet another possibility would be to estimate a
child victim’s future income, and then determine his VSL or his VSLYs by extrapolating
from the figures of an adult who has that child’s future income.123 In the latter two cases,
children would have higher valuations of life than adults do, which appears intuitively
correct.124 We think that the second approach seems the most reasonable, but there is no
simple way to establish its superiority.
3. Offsetting parental behavior
A conclusion in favor of any one of the three approaches must be qualified,
however. The risks faced by children are, to a considerable extent, controlled by their
121
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parents, and one must be careful that regulatory policy and parental autonomy do not
clash, leading to perverse results. In a sense, this problem is not unique to the context of
valuing children’s lives. Offsetting behavior can occur in many contexts.125 But the
mechanisms here have distinctive features.
To see the problem, consider a simple case where the household that benefits
from a regulation also incurs its full costs. Suppose that Parent (P) is willing to pay $20 to
avoid a 1/100,000 risk of death for his child (C). An agency issues a regulation that forces
P to pay, say, $50 to avoid this risk by buying safety helmets, car seats, or some other
child safety device. Although P must now pay $50 to reduce this risk in order to avoid a
legal sanction, P retains the discretion to spend less money on C. If P can save money by
reducing safety along some other margin, one not regulated by the agency, P will do so.
For example, perhaps P will stop sending C to school on the (safe but expensive) bus and
put him in a (cheap but riskier) car pool. And even if P cannot do this, P might spend less
money on C in other ways: for example, purchasing fewer toys or clothes or food. Under
the stated assumptions, both P’s and C’s welfare will decline as a result of the
regulation.126
These problems do not show that children’s VSL should always be treated as
lower than that of adults, but they point out some difficulties with the contrary view.127
The proper degree of adjustment is an empirical question on which information is absent.
If parents adjust in the manner described, then it would be incorrect to base a child’s VSL
on the VSLYs of adults. On the other hand, we do not know whether or to what extent
parents adjust in this way, and it might seem implausible to some readers.
We do not have a simple conclusion about appropriate valuation of mortality risks
faced by children. Certainly tort law errs by excluding the child’s hedonic loss and
including only the distress felt by parents. For regulators, perhaps the best approach
would be to multiply VSLY by the number of remaining life-years, with a lower amount
(perhaps in the range of the parental valuation of $2 to $3 million) used for regulations
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for which parents are expected to adjust (perhaps child safety seats). Tort law should
award an amount within this range for the hedonic loss to the child from his death.
D. Loss to Society
Commentators sometimes argue that tort law undervalues the loss of life because
it ignores the cost to “society.”128 Most people produce value that they do not fully
consume or give to dependents; this value benefits strangers in the larger society.
Workers produce goods that consumers value more than the price that they pay;
entrepreneurs start new businesses that employ people; people give to charity; inventors
invent products whose value is greater than what the inventors can capture through patent
law; the same is true of authors of books and the protections of copyright law; there are
countless Good Samaritan acts; and many people devote their lives to public service.
When these people die, isn’t there a loss to society beyond the loss to the person who dies
and his immediate family and friends? Perhaps oddly, neither tort nor regulatory law
counts these losses. 129 Here as elsewhere, there are obvious difficulties of monetization,
but the failure to assign any value at all is puzzling.
One response is that these benefits may be smaller than they first appear. Labor
markets are vast, and the cost of replacing a worker who dies will generally be trivial.
(Recall that we are speaking here of losses of society; losses to the worker and
dependents are assessed independently.) In addition, many people do bad things as well
as good things, and presumably the hostile and aggressive acts must be subtracted from
the Good Samaritan acts. Finally, to the extent that the size of the population is a concern
for economic growth or national security purposes, the government has many tools at its
disposal for adjusting it. Temporary visas can be issued for foreign workers; immigration
can be increased; and other barriers against migration can be reduced or eliminated. And
birth control policies can be adjusted to increase or decrease population as necessary.
Still, serious thought should be given to monetizing the loss to society when a
person dies. Assume again that the legal system had a social hedometer, one that could
measure that loss and turn it into monetary equivalents. It seems clear that if an accurate
128
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assessment of the loss could be made, those who subject people to mortality risks should
be required to take that loss into account. The question is how to proceed in the absence
of a hedometer. One possibility would be to try to determine how much people are
willing to pay to avoid the deaths of casual acquaintances. This question raises some of
the same issues as those involved in the monetization of grief. If the relevant amounts are
likely to be low, current practice might be justified; but a great deal of additional work
needs to be done on this topic.
E. Foreigners
Many wrongful acts kill people who are not citizens of the United States. Some of
these people reside in the United States, either legally or illegally (“alien residents,” for
our purposes); others live outside the United States (“alien nonresidents”). Some of these
wrongful acts are committed by Americans or firms predominantly run or owned by
Americans; others are committed by aliens or foreigners. All of these acts are potentially
governed by American tort and regulatory law.
Let us consider two examples, one from tort and one from environmental
regulation. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a case involving the torture and murder of a
Paraguayan citizen by a Paraguayan police official, the plaintiffs, who were the brother
and father of the victim, brought a claim in an American court under the Alien Tort
Statute, and obtained damages of more than $10 million.130 A magistrate had initially
awarded them $375,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, funeral and
medical expenses, and so forth; the district court also awarded punitive damages of over
$9 million. The court claimed to base the compensatory awards mainly on the domestic
law of the countries in which the torts took place. If so, the compensatory damages were
probably low for the same reason that they are low in the U.S.: domestic law in foreign
countries does not award damages for hedonic loss, but only for lost income and the
like.131 However, as a result of the punitive award the damages were far in excess of what
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would have been available under Paraguayan law, because punitive damages are not
awarded in wrongful death cases in Paraguay.132
Many toxic substances produced in the United States contaminate territory outside
American borders. Chemicals such as PCBs migrate across borders through atmospheric
processes, and may be ingested by people living far away. Most of the EPA’s regulatory
work involves purely domestic statutes, and the EPA refuses to count foreign lives when
evaluating regulations based on those statutes, even when the substance being regulated
crosses borders and harms foreign environments.133 If it is proper to count the lives of
foreigners, then the cost-benefit analyses that EPA has relied on undervalue the benefits
of regulations.
These examples reflect an international version of the domestic tension between
tort and regulatory law. Because tort law in other countries, like in the U.S., is mainly
limited to compensating dependents, foreign tort awards usually undervalue the victim’s
loss. Because American courts generally defer to foreign law in case of torts committed
on foreign soil, the low tort awards in other countries are implicitly incorporated into
American foreign policy, and, in particular, American VSLs for foreign lives. By
contrast, American regulatory policy generally ignores foreigners. Which approach is
correct?
Our argument so far has been that the VSL should reflect people’s willingness to
pay to avoid risks. Because the willingness to pay to avoid risks increases with income,
poorer people have lower VSLs than wealthier people.134 Because many aliens are
substantially poorer than Americans, they will have very low VSLs.135 Reflecting crossnational wealth differences, VSL is highly variable across nations.136 Studies find a VSL
as low as $200,000 for Taiwan, $500,000 for South Korea, and $1.2 million for India—
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but $21.7 million for Canada and $19 million for Australia.137 Consider the following
table138:
Table 4: VSL Across Nations
Nation and Year of Study

VSL (in 2000 US$)

Japan (1991)

$9.7 million

South Korea (1993)

$0.8 million

Canada (1989)

$3.9-4.7 million

India (1996/97)

$1.2-1.5 million

Taiwan (1997)

$0.2-0.9 million

Australia (1997)

$11.3-19.1 million

Hong Kong (1998)

$1.7 million

Switzerland (2001)

$6.3–8.6 million

United Kingdom (2000)

$19.9 million

In addition, some aliens may have lower VSLs than Americans because of
cultural and social differences. For example, if people in a foreign culture do not fear
death as much as Americans do, they will have lower VSLs, all else equal. The
conclusion that aliens should have lower VSLs follows from the argument that VSLs
should reflect social costs.
This view might seem offensive,139 but certainly as a general rule, it is more
consistent with the well-being of aliens than the contrary view is. First, consider the case
where a particular alien in a foreign country both enjoys the benefit and bears the cost of
a regulation or tort rule. For example, a labor regulation requires foreign suppliers of
goods for the American market to provide safety devices to workers. The workers are
willing to pay $20 to avoid a 1/100,000 risk of death; the safety device eliminates that
risk, but results in a reduction in pay of $30. Unless the willingness to pay figure is a
product of ignorance or some failure of rationality,140 the regulation harms rather benefits
the workers.
137
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Second, consider the case where one nonresident alien enjoys the benefit of the
regulation, and another alien (living in the same country) bears the cost. A regulation
requires factories to reduce levels of emissions: neighbors would be willing to pay $100
to reduce the risk of death created by the emissions but local consumers bear a cost of
$200 from higher prices. If the neighbors and consumers have equal wealth, the
regulation simply redistributes wealth from one group to another: it does not increase
welfare but reduces welfare. If the neighbors are poorer than the consumers, then the
regulation might be justified, but what justifies it is the distributional benefit, not the use
of inflated VSLs. If the U.S. wants to effect a redistribution of wealth between groups in
other countries, and seeks to use regulatory and tort law to do so, there is no reason to
limit these rules to cases of death; they could be used for nonfatal harms as well. And the
use of inflated (that is, American) VSLs would only obscure the nature of the regulatory
intervention.
A further question is this: Even assuming that the redistribution would be in the
right direction, why would the U.S. want to redistribute wealth in other countries through
regulatory and tort law? One problem is that, unless the U.S. seizes control of the
government of the foreign country, the government will be able to undo the American
redistribution by using tax and other instruments. In any case it would normally make
more sense for the U.S. to negotiate with the government for redistributions of wealth,
rather than unilaterally intervening. Finally, if unilateral intervention is to occur, the
courts (in the case of tort law) would seem to be a poor vehicle; better to rely on the state
department and other executive branch agencies. That the U.S. has rarely concerned itself
with the distribution of wealth in other countries—focusing instead on trade, security, and
human rights—suggests that indirect redistribution through tort and regulatory law would
not be politically sustainable.
Third, consider the case where nonresident aliens enjoy the benefit of the
regulation, and American citizens bear the cost. Suppose that regulation that reduces
emissions that damage the ozone layer harms mainly Americans, who pay the higher
prices, while benefiting mainly people living in other parts of the world. Consider two
versions of this regulation: the first (low pollution control) is based on a cost-benefit
analysis that values foreign lives lower than American lives. The second (high pollution
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control) is based on a cost-benefit analysis that values foreign lives and American lives
equally, at the American level. Under the stated assumptions, the second redistributes
resources from Americans to people living in other countries. Which regulation is
superior?
In the abstract, the answer is hardly clear, and the question cannot be sensibly
approached without consideration of American foreign policy toward the nations that
benefit from the regulation. Let us consider the relation between the U.S. and, say, India.
The two states can gain a lot from each other by cooperating, but there is also a danger of
conflict. To simplify, suppose that the U.S. wants three things from India: security
cooperation (such as flyover rights); an open market for U.S. goods; and an improvement
in the treatment of religious minorities. India seeks from the U.S. similar things:
diplomatic assistance with its ongoing disputes with Pakistan; an open market for Indian
goods; and an improvement of American treatment of Indian residents. Suppose that at a
hypothetical stage 1, India and the U.S. achieve a balance between their aims: each gives
a little of what the other wants.
Now at stage 2, an American regulatory agency issues an environmental
regulation that happens to benefit India considerably, and at great cost to American
citizens. At this point, the American diplomatic authorities might argue that because the
U.S. is conferring a new benefit on India (say, less flooding of coastal areas), India
should respond by conferring a new benefit on the U.S. (say, more trade). India could
respond by saying thanks for reducing coastal flooding—that is important—but it is not
more important to us than preserving our domestic X industry. In short, the new
regulation disturbs the cooperative equilibrium between the U.S. and India: the U.S.,
perceiving itself as giving more than it is getting, will (in theory) respond by withdrawing
some other benefits, and India will retaliate. The new equilibrium could involve a lower
level of cooperation—one in which the U.S. gives India something of little value to India
and so gets something of little value in return—unless the U.S. government can change
the regulation in a way that benefits India less.141
Our point is that under certain circumstances, regulations and tort rules that are
based on inflated foreign VSLs will redistribute wealth from Americans to foreign
141
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governments. Such transfers would not be wildly popular in the abstract, at least among
Americans. They may nonetheless be desirable for reasons of foreign policy or social
justice, but they should be recognized as such; the use of the inflated VSL conceals the
magnitude of the transfer and even its nature. Further, transfers—whether disguised
through inflated VSLs or undisguised—should cohere with foreign policy; otherwise,
they will lead to perverse results or be ineffective. The simple conclusion is that in many
imaginable circumstances, a high VSL, for people in other countries, will produce
perverse redistribution or redistribution for which there is no strong claim—and that even
when the redistribution through a high VSL seems desirable (because it benefits poor
people on balance), there are many questions about whether regulatory agencies should
adopt it. It follows that as a general rule, both agencies and courts should use a VSL that
attempts to match the figure in the relevant nation.

IV. Proposals for Reform
A. Use of VSL in Regulations
Tort law offers two principal lessons for regulatory policy. The first involves the
need for a greater degree of individuation. The second involves the need to pay attention
to the interests of dependents. A properly designed system of valuation would move
substantially in both directions.
1. Individuation
We have seen that under the theory that agencies now use, VSL is calculated on
the basis of people’s willingness to pay. That very theory raises serious doubts about the
government’s use of a uniform number. The appropriate value varies across both risks
and persons. If, for example, the risk is accompanied by a high degree of pain and
suffering, it deserves more attention than if it is not—a conclusion that is supported by
studies finding a kind of “premium” for bad deaths.142 Agencies should therefore provide
a higher VSL for cancer risks than for other risks, a possibility that EPA has recognized
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in its “sensitivity analysis” for arsenic.143 A great deal more should be done in this
vein.144 As tort law demonstrates, a uniform number is extremely difficult to defend.
Variations across persons are important as well. To be sure, it is impractical to
think that regulators should fully individuate risks across persons, in part because
regulations often affect many people at once. But less fine-grained distinctions are
possible. For example, people over sixty tend to show a lower VSL than people between
thirty and forty.145 Regulators might build on these figures to generate different numbers
for programs protecting people at different points along the age spectrum. Putting the
difficult case of children to one side, agency rules should have a lower value when the
benefited class consists largely of elderly people. A movement in this direction would
have significant consequences for valuation; it would drive down the monetized benefits
of a number of programs delivering health gains largely to senior citizens.
Additional distinctions are possible. If a program would benefit largely wealthy
people, regulators might use an unusually high VSL—a point that would support a higher
VSL for safety decisions involving airlines (the exact opposite, not incidentally, of
current practice, which involves an unusually low number for airline safety146). More
controversially, programs protecting the poor might be given a lower VSL, in a way that
tracks the approach of tort law, at least where those who benefit from regulation are also
paying for it. A possible objection to this approach is that in some circumstances, a high
VSL, for the poor, might be beneficial to the poor, simply because they receive benefits
for which they pay only a fragment. We do not resolve the obvious empirical and ethical
complexities here.147 We note simply that a higher degree of individuation would be
desirable, that in most cases it would raise no serious ethical problems, and that tort law
shows that a movement toward greater individuation is both feasible and consistent with
longstanding practices and intuitions.
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2. Dependents.
For regulatory policy, the most obvious gap is that agency numbers do not recognize the
fact that a death causes welfare losses to many people other than the victim. If a worker is
killed as a result of carcinogens in the workplace, others will almost always be affected.
Agency failure to take account of the welfare losses results in numbers that are far too
low.
We have suggested the importance of distinguishing between two sets of losses:
grief on the one hand and lost income on the other. Following tort law, full individuation
would take account of the fact that the size of those losses very much depends on the
particular situation. Other things being equal, the loss of a parent with six young children
causes more serious harm than the loss of someone without dependents. If our earlier
calculations are correct, several million dollars would be added to the conventional
assessment of the benefits of a regulation that saved that parent’s statistical life. A serious
difficulty here is that agency regulations protect broad classes of people and hence it is
quite impractical to think that agencies should make fully individual judgments about the
welfare losses. But it is not impractical to think that agencies should adjust their numbers
in a way that ensures that serious welfare losses are not ignored. As in the case of
statistical risks, contingent valuation studies and market evidence might be consulted to
generate appropriate numbers for grief. We have offered some suggestions about how
this might be done. For regulations, individual assessments are of course impossible, but
a positive number is better than no number, and population-wide means would be a
sensible place to start.
In the regulatory context, there is a cautionary note. Any effort at individuation
would have a high degree of political salience and would undoubtedly mobilize affected
interests. Even if the social science were less ambiguous than it now is, well-organized
groups would undoubtedly engage in special pleading, attempting to move agency
practices in their preferred directions. A uniform number helps to insulate agencies from
the relevant pressures. In the context of tort suits, individuation does not face those
pressures, and hence there is little need for insulation. In principle, however,
individuation is clearly desirable, and it seems quite pessimistic to think that the effort to
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produce greater accuracy should be rejected because of the possible effects of interestgroup maneuvering.
B. Use of VSL in Tort Law
In wrongful death actions, damages should be calculated in the following way.
1. The Hedonic Loss of the Victim
For deterrence purposes, the tortfeasor should pay the amount that the victim
would be willing to pay to avoid the risk that was imposed on him by the tortfeasor’s
class of actions, divided by that risk (R/q). Damages should not be based on lost income;
as in the regulatory context, lost income is at best a proxy for the victim’s loss.
Deterrence can be satisfied through payment to the government, but if it is paid to the
estate or dependents, then indirect compensation is also achieved.
The amount can be calculated in two ways. First, the VSL (or VSLY) used by
agencies could be used, with any adjustments as necessary to reflect individual factors:
the defendant’s risk preference, life expectancy (if VSLY is used), wealth, quality of life,
and so forth. Indeed, it is possible that the victim’s own wages will reflect his VSL, if he
has a risky job. So long as agencies use a uniform figure, courts might start with the
standard $6 million figure, and then make adjustments as appropriate. If agencies used
more refined figures, as we have argued that they should, then courts might begin with
those figures instead, and make appropriate adjustments from that amount. Second, the
jury could be asked to determine the hedonic loss. However, the proper jury question is
not “what is the value of the life’s pleasures lost by the victim?” This question is too
abstract. A better question would be: “estimate the amount of money that the victim
would have paid to avoid the risk in question.” 148 Of course an abstract answer to that
question would be unreliable; VSL studies should be used to educate juries about
common valuations, so that their own estimates will be informed rather than arbitrary.149
148
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To ensure consistent and rational awards, we would strongly prefer the first approach, on
the ground that juries are not well-equipped to answer these questions; but if a strong role
for the jury is deemed important, the second would also work so long as the jury’s
judgments are disciplined by expert witnesses and the court.
This reform would have a significant impact on tort awards, especially for the
elderly in non-hedonic loss states. We can already see the logic of our argument at work
in some of the hedonic loss states. Consider Thomas v. Hilburn,150 in which the jury
awarded wrongful death damages of $300,000 to the son of the 75 year old victim. On
appeal, the defendant argued that damages should be reduced to $66,311 for lost income,
plus a few thousand dollars more for medical expenses, funeral expenses, and property
damage. The court rejected the argument because Mississippi was (at the time) a hedonic
loss state. Although our approach would have suggested a verdict of a few million or so,
depending on the wealth and other characteristics of the victim, the court clearly
recognized the key point that the hedonic loss of an elderly man is much higher than his
lost income.151
In the tort context, there is an additional complication. Valuation of statistical
risks has occurred for risks of specified magnitudes, usually ranging from 1/10,000 to
1/100,000.152 Insofar as tort law is dealing with risks in this range, use of agency figures
is fully appropriate. But it should be clear that these numbers need not be taken to support
a VSL that is independent of probability.153 Suppose that people would be willing to pay
$60 to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000. From this it does not follow that people would be
willing to pay $6000 to eliminate a risk of 1/1000, or $60,000 to eliminate a risk of 1/100,
reflect the losses to other people, not to the victim who is the subject of the tort dispute. However, courts
frequently use statistics about other people in order to award damages in tort cases. For example, when
courts calculate lost income in order to determine damages for dependents, they use mortality tables; these
tables are based on the lives of other people, not on the victim’s own life, which would not make any sense.
Just as courts use statistics about other people in order to estimate the victim’s life expectancy, courts
should use statistics about other people in order to estimate how much the victim would have been willing
to pay in order to avoid a risk of death.
150
654 So. 2d 898, 903 (Miss. 1995).
151
See also Motorola Communications and Electronics, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 555 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1989)
(allowing $150,000 award for the death of an 85 year old man); Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead Sch.
Dist., 733 A.2d 394, 407-08 (N.H. 1999) (allowing $900,000 award for the death of a child whose lost
future income was about $700,000). New Hampshire also recognizes hedonic losses in wrongful death
cases. See supra.
152
See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates With Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42 Ec.
Inquiry 29, 33 (2004) (showing fatality risks ranging from about 1/100,000 to 45/100,000).
153
See Richard Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Reason (forthcoming 2004).
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or $600,000 to eliminate a risk of 1/10. It is plausible to believe that people’s WTP to
reduce statistical risks is nonlinear.154 As the probability approaches 100%, people
become willing to pay an amount for risk reduction that rises nonlinearly to 100% of their
income, and—at some point—become unwilling to accept any amount in return for
giving up their entitlement to life.155 From this it follows that if a defendant imposes risks
that are far higher than those with which agencies deal, the agency figures are too low,
and hence the tort system should use significantly higher ones.
The sheer variety of wrongful death actions, in terms of both probability and kind
of death, severely complicates the inquiry into appropriate damage awards. Insofar as the
tort system is dealing with probabilities in the general range with which agencies deal, it
can build on (appropriately reformed) agency practice. Insofar as the tort system is
dealing with the most egregious conduct—homicide, for example—the regulatory
analysis of WTP does not apply directly, but a standard amount of (say) $6 million at
least provides an appropriate floor. Insofar as the conduct imposes high probability risks,
as through gross negligence, a similar floor is appropriate, supplemented perhaps by
punitive damages. These suggestions are in line with our general emphasis on the fact
that all mortality risks are not the same. What cannot be defended is the total exclusion of
hedonic damages in wrongful death actions.
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See id.
There is a great deal of work on disparities between willingness to pay and willingness to accept
(WTA). See, for an overview, Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U.L
Rev. 1227 (2003). Such disparities are found in the context of risks. See, e.g., see W. Kip Viscusi et al., An
Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. Econ. 465
(1987). It follows that people would pay less to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000 than they would demand to be
subject to that same risk. See id. One advantage of the market data on which agencies currently rely is that
the WTP/WTA disparity is essentially irrelevant. If workers and consumers who face a risk of 1/100,000
receive $60 in compensation, the result can be described in terms of either WTA or WTP; any such
description is simply a matter of framing. But we lack reliable market data about how to value much higher
risks -- say, risks of 1/50, 1/20, or 1/10. And for such risks, willingness to accept and willingness to pay
figures surely diverge, not least because the income constraint applies to WTP but not to WTA. People
would undoubtedly pay a great deal to eliminate a mortality risk of 1/20; but they would demand even more
to be subject to that risk, and many people would not incur that risk for any amount. It is not entirely clear,
in principle, whether WTP or WTA is appropriate, though our view is that willingness to accept is correct
and therefore the appropriate compensatory award is either infinite or higher than anyone can pay. Thus, a
billionaire who murders someone ought to forfeit his entire wealth. As a practical matter, however, it
probably does not make much difference that the tort system does not generate such high awards, given that
the entire wealth of most murderers is extremely limited.
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2. Harm to Survivors
As we have seen, calculating the loss to survivors is difficult in practice, but
conceptually straightforward. For deterrence purposes, survivors should recover for their
welfare loss—this means grief, mental distress, loss of companionship, and the like. It is
less clear what dependents should recover in terms of lost support (such as lost income
attributable to their care). The conceptually proper recovery is the amount of money that
would make the survivor just as well off (financially) as he would have been if the death
had not occurred, which will usually be tied to the loss of household economies of scale
and the breadwinner’s degree of altruism. This amount may be higher than lost income (if
the victim does a lot of work for the household that is not compensated in the market).
And it may be lower (if the survivor can easily get a job and the victim was never very
generous in the first place).
If our approach were adopted, tort damages would rise, especially for children and
the elderly. As we have seen, damages for wrongful death are currently under about $3
million, based on lost income, mental distress, and the like. Under our system, they are
likely to be as much as $6 million or higher for the average person. As for children, tort
damages currently should be low in jurisdictions that exclude lost income (though it is
not clear that this is the case); and for the elderly, tort damages currently should be (and
apparently are) low even in jurisdictions that include lost income, given that their earning
years are almost over. By contrast, under our approach their damages are likely to be,
again, in the $6 million or higher range.156 For adults with dependents, we suspect that an
additional several hundred thousands of dollars per dependent would be added to the $6
million baseline. 157
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Elderly people apparently have VSLs that are either equal to (or even higher than) or not much lower
than those of younger people. See Aldy & Viscusi, supra.
157
If the victim incurs unusual pain and suffering prior to death, including the distress of anticipating one’s
own death in the near future, this cost may not be reflected in standard VSLs. Thus, additional damages
should be awarded for them. Damages for medical and funeral expenses should also be awarded. See Mark
Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for
Nonmonetary Injuries, who suggests using WTP estimates, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 773 (1995). See also David
W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior To Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 256
(1989).
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V. Positive Questions
Our comparison of tort law and regulatory policy raises an obvious positive
question. Why do these two areas of law take such different approaches to valuing lives?
The beginning of an answer to this question is that even though the two areas of law have
an overlapping purpose—the deterrence of harmful conduct—they also have radically
different historical origins and orientations: tort law is ex post and individualized, while
regulatory law is ex ante and generalized. As a result, tort law is naturally more
particularistic and less rule-bound. The ex ante focus of regulation pushes administrators
away from case-specific standards and in the direction of rule-bound judgments. But this
point raises many complexities.
A. In General
Tort law’s ex post and individualistic orientation has several consequences. First,
the implicit (or explicit) valuation of human lives in the tort context is information-rich.
Courts have access to a great deal of evidence about the particular parties and
circumstances. Under the rules of evidence, all relevant evidence may be introduced to
the court, and both plaintiff and defendant have strong incentives to take advantage of
these rules. Given that the victim is a real, identifiable person, it is natural for the court to
determine the actual loss, including losses to dependents, rather than to rely on statistical
averages. In fact there is no need to rely on such averages, which provides less accurate
information than the facts themselves.
Second, tort remedies direct the decisionmaker to compare the victim’s post-tort
state with her pre-tort state, and to ignore the rest of society. This approach works well
enough when the tort causes a financial loss or a physical injury, but when it kills the
victim, the decisionmaker has no way to compare post-tort and pre-tort well-being in a
way that can be reliably monetized. To determine the hedonic loss from death, one cannot
look at the actual victim’s experience of death; one can rely only on statistical inference
based on generalization from the rest of society. But in view of judicial traditions, this
would be unfamiliar and even odd in the tort setting.
Third, and following from the first two points, tort damages tend to be highly
variable. Juries lack reference points, so their judgments will depend heavily on the
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presentation of evidence by lawyers, and on whatever anchors,158 prejudices, and
expectations citizens bring to the jury box. Juries might also react emotionally to the case,
or misunderstand jury instructions, and allow irrelevant factors (like a desire for revenge)
to influence their determination of the award.
Fourth, tort law has low public visibility, at least at the system-wide level.
Individual awards may receive considerable public attention, but the system of awards—
the median award, the mean award, the variance—does not.159 Hence public scrutiny is
relatively weak unless and until a salient network of awards (as in the case of the
September 11 fund) is announced. The difficulties of monetization, the variable figures,
and the possible arbitrariness of many outcomes attract little in the way of scrutiny and
review, not least because of the ex post nature of litigation and the fact that awards are
issued one at a time.
Compare regulatory law. Regulatory decisions are ex ante and highly abstract.
The victims of the regulated conduct are not identified, and so their personal
characteristics do not stand out (although sometimes a disaster or crisis may provoke the
regulation160). Whereas court cases are emotionally rich, regulatory decisions often
(though not always) seem dry and technical, even though usually much more is at stake.
The ex ante and general orientation of regulatory policy has several consequences.
First, because one cannot identify the actual people benefited by a regulation, one must
rely on averages. The usual notion is that although all individuals are different,
differences will balance each other out, so that averages can be used. Thus, if a regulation
protects people of type X with a VSL of $7 million and people of type Y with a VSL of
$5 million, regulators use the average valuation of $6 million for a regulation that affects
people evenly divided into the two types.
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On the relevance of anchors, see Gretchen Chapman and Eric Johnson, in Heuristics and Biases: The
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds. 2002).
159
Indeed, the extreme awards that receive media attention are, according to some, too rare to be a matter
of concern. See Deborah Jones Merritt and Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New
Empirical Evidence, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 315 (1999). A similar argument has been made about punitive
damages; see Theodore Eisenberg, Neil LaFountain, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman, and Martin T. Wells,
Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743 (2002) (arguing that
punitive damages are roughly correlated with compensatory damages); but see and Joni Hersch and W. Kip
Viscusi, Punitive Damages, 33 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2004) (disputing this claim).
160
See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, Stan L Rev (1999).
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This reasoning is not implausible, and sometimes averages are appropriate despite
their crudeness; but they can lead regulators astray. Some regulations affect only persons
of type X, and other regulations affect only persons of type Y; then different valuations
should be used. Indeed, we know that some regulations protect people against cancer, a
risk that people are willing to pay a premium to avoid, whereas other regulations protect
people against sudden unanticipated death, a risk that occasions less in the way of public
concern.161 So too, some regulations affect the poor more than the rich, urban people
more than rural people, and so forth. Under the very theory that animates current
regulatory practice, individualized VSLs, taking account of these differences, are
important.
Second, regulatory decisions affect more people than a tort award does, and thus
are more politically salient. The greater political salience of regulatory decisions may
have good effects simply because public scrutiny can be a corrective against ill-motivated
or foolish decisions; but here we focus on some bad or troubling effects. The most
obvious is that the symbolism of sensible and disaggregated regulatory decisions may
bother people because such decisions seem in conflict with other values—here, we have
in mind the controversy valuing human lives at all, or the likely more intense controversy
over valuing the lives of the rich more than the lives of the poor.162 The risks of public
skepticism may also explain agencies’ failure to value the lives of children properly and
openly.
By contrast, the isolation of tort awards suppresses these symbolic concerns.
Almost no one complains about the fact that poor people obtain lower damages in tort
awards because they have lost less future income; and the existence of the disparity, and
its longstanding character, at least raises problems for those who believe that ethical
principles require all deaths to be valued the same way. But it appears to be politically
difficult to draw the logical conclusion that VSLs for poor people should be lower than
VSLs for rich people in regulatory decisionmaking.
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See Revesz, supra note; Hammit and Liu, supra note.
Consider the controversy over the idea of “life years,” an idea that strikes many people as ethically
problematic because it treats elderly people as less valuable than younger people. See Ackerman and
Heinzerling, supra note.
162

55

We are unable to explain why agencies have neglected the losses to dependents.
One possible answer is that agencies assume that victims’ WTPs for bearing risks of
death incorporate these costs; but as we have explained, it is unlikely that these WTPs
incorporate these costs fully. Another possible answer is lack of information; it is not
easy to generate a plausible number to capture the costs to dependents on some
population-wide basis. But this problem ought to be remediable. A probable contributor
to the gap is that cost-benefit analysis and the use of VSLs is in its infancy—as a formal
part of regulatory law, it is only about twenty-five years old163—and agencies have
focused on the large problems while neglecting or overlooking more subtle issues. But it
is now time for the VSL methodology to advance to a new stage of sophistication.
B. September 11 and Compensation
The different orientations of tort and regulatory law were reflected in an
interesting way by the decisionmaking process of the commission that was set up to
award compensation to victims of the 9/11 terrorist attack. We have briefly outlined the
resulting regulations. Before returning to this topic, let us conduct two thought
experiments.
First, suppose that Congress had never set up the 9/11 compensation fund, and
instead the victims and survivors had sued under state tort law. Suppose they succeeded
in establishing the liability of defendants such as the airlines. How would damages have
been awarded? It is clear that wealth differences would have been seen in wrongful death
and survivors’ awards. The dependents of investment bankers would have obtained
awards far in excess of those obtained by the dependents of fire fighters. In addition, the
awards would have varied significantly in light of the different characteristics of each
victim. But there also would have been considerable inexplicable variance in the awards,
variance that would not be traceable to relevant factors but to the vagaries of jury
decisionmaking and the law of tort. Hence inequalities would have been pervasive—
some a justified product of existing rules, others a result of simple “noise” in the system.
Second, suppose that an agency had, prior to the 9/11 attack, issued regulations
designed to force the owners of buildings such as the World Trade Center to install safety
devices that would have saved lives in case of a terrorist attack or similar disaster. Here,
163

See Executive Order 12291, supra.
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we can be sure that the agency would have used uniform valuations—such as $6.1
million per life saved—that would have ignored wealth differences and other differences
between victims. The agency would also have ignored dependents.
How did the 9/11 commission make its decisions? On the one hand, the
commission was directed by Congress to rely on tort principles, and for that reason it
used formulas that took into account wealth differences.164 Estates of investment bankers
did receive more compensation than estates of fire fighters.165 In addition, awards were
an increasing function of the number of dependents. On the other hand, public and
political discomfort with these disparate awards—which seemed to dishonor the fire
fighters, and also to distinguish victims along class lines—led the commission to adopt
awards that were less dispersed than would have occurred under the tort system.166
There is a lesson here. Because individual tort cases concern just one person or a
few people, awards are unlikely to be politically salient or to be influenced by irrelevant
political considerations. But because they are ex post and individualized, they usually fail
to take advantage of information that is accessible only at the level of the general
population. The 9/11 Commission combined the virtues and flaws of both approaches.
Because of the political salience of the task, and because awarding damages to thousands
of people made comparison easy and obvious, the commission was constrained, like
regulatory agencies, to use relatively uniform numbers; recall that a standard number was
used for noneconomic damages. At the same time, arbitrariness was therefore limited—in
the sense that people in similar circumstances received similar awards. Because the
commission was directed to use tort principles, the numbers were not fully uniform, and a
degree of individual variation was properly allowed. But the use of tort principles also
made it impossible to use figures for hedonic losses, and instead the commission relied
on flawed figures such as lost income, with the result that average awards—in the $2 to
164

See Explanation of Process for Computing Presumed Economic Loss, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/loss_calc_deceased.html.
165
For example, the spouse of a 40 year old with an income of $50,000 would receive a little over $1
million, whereas the spouse of a 40 year old with an income of $225,000 would receive about $3.5 million
– not including non-economic loss. See Explanation of Process for Computing Presumed Economic Loss,
supra.
166
See Chen, Man Behind, supra, at B3 (“The statute suffered from two conflicting impulses: to follow the
standards of lost future income typical in tort cases, while at the same time making the fund fair to all
income groups, Mr. Feinberg [the special master] said. He ultimately devised the program to prevent it
from favoring the wealthy over the financially disadvantaged, he said.”)
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$3 million range—were less than the hedonic losses that actually occurred, according to
the VSL methodology used by agencies.167
In normal situations, significant improvements are possible. Courts can, and ought
to, take advantage of information about average persons when the relevant information
about a particular victim is lacking (such as WTP to avoid the risk that produced
death).168 And although politics will always constrain agencies, there are certainly many
steps that agencies can take to improve their use of VSLs without running afoul of
political constraints. At a minimum, we see no reason why agencies cannot estimate the
losses to dependents of people who are killed by regulated conduct, and it seems likely to
us that at least some kinds of individualization will be possible—by, for example, giving
a premium for risks that are especially dreaded.

Conclusion
In the United States, two independent bodies of law assign dollar values to deaths.
Regulatory agencies, drawing on willingness to pay studies, use a uniform number that
takes no account of losses to dependents and others. In wrongful death actions, courts
attempt to compensate survivors, failing to incorporate the loss to the decedent and
ensuring a high degree of variability in awards. For both bodies of law, deterrence is an
important goal, and from the standpoint of deterrence, both make serious blunders. And
for both, a key question is how to combine accuracy and administrability.
There are two central problems with regulatory law. First, the value of a statistical
life is uniform rather than disaggregated. The very theory that underlies current practice
calls for far more in the way of individuation. Second, agency figures do not include the
losses to dependents and others; the result is underdeterrence. We have made suggestions
about how agencies might remedy these two problems. The central problem with tort law
is that it does not include the welfare loss to the decedent; its current reliance on the
decedent’s pre-death losses and the dependents’ losses results in undervaluation of
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And, bizarrely, death benefits for soldiers and public safety officials as the basis for non-economic, that
is, mental distress, compensation for the dependents of victims. See Explanation of Process for Computing
Presumed Economic Loss, supra.
168
Compare the proposal of Baldus et al., supra.
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morality risks, and hence underdeterrence. We have also made suggestions about how
both bodies of law should deal with the deaths of children and foreigners.
If our recommendations were accepted, we would expect tort awards to become
higher, more uniform, and less arbitrary than they currently are. We would also expect
VSLs used by regulatory agencies to be more variable—in many cases lower and in many
cases higher. The inclusion of losses to dependents should result in more stringent
regulations, as the effective benefit from a life saved would be increased.
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